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THE SALAZAR "NEW STATE" AND  
EUROPEAN FASCISM
-Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*
The difference between Salazar and the other 
dictators is less a matter of character than of situation and 
sheer opportunity. It’s luck as much as anything else. If 
you'd taken Stalin or Hitler or Mussolini, plucked them up 
from where they were and given them Portugal instead, how 
much trouble could any of them have caused ?"
David Slavitt, Salazar Blinks, (New York: 1988), p.39.
The aim of this "working Paper" is to observe and analyze the way the social 
sciences interpreted the Salazar "New State" and particularly of the problem of "Fascism 
in Portugal" in the period between the beginning of the sixties and the end of the 
eighties* 1.
I have chosen this particular period because of the course taken by international 
historiography on Fascism which developed as a structured field at the beginning of the 
sixties. Although the main interpretative bases are contemporary to the political and social
1 * This "Working Paper" was prepared for a project on European Fascism developed at the Department 
of History and Civilization of the EUI. I would like to thank, for their support, the Department, the 
President, M. Emile Noel, and particularly Professor Stuart Woolf, responsible for this and other 
initiatives that I developed with other researchers and fellows during the last years. Its first version was 
written when I was a Luso American Foundation Visiting Fellow at the Center for European Studies, 
Department of Political Science, Stanford University, in 1988-89. I would also like to thank its 
Director, Professor Philippe C. Schmitter, and express my appreciation of the working conditions and the 
stimulating intellectual climate I found there.
1 Cf. Antdnio Costa Pinto, "O Salazarismo e o Fascismo Europeu-As primeiras interpreta^Oes das 
ciencias sociais", AA. VV., Salazar e o Salazarismo (Lisboa: 1989), pp. 155/188. For an expanded 
version of this study see my book, 0  Salazarismo e o Fascismo Europeu- Problemas de interpretagdo nas 



























































































phenomenon in question, it was in the sixties that historical research on the subject was 
begun. This research not only re-evaluated the theories arising from the political struggle 
but also created some new ones. It could even be said, without great controversy, that it 
was in this period that the "interpretative market", which is still used today, was created. 
Considering the importance and the overlapping, in some periods and fields of research, 
of History and Political Sociology, I will follow both their courses.
The fact of the proximity in time made the study of the "New State" a mixed 
sphere "par excellence", in which various traditions, from Political Science to History to 
Sociology intermingled. With its development severely limited until the seventies, 
contemporary history, namely the history of Portugal in the 20th century, is still a kind of 
poor relation. Its inclusion in university curricula is very recent, academic qualifications 
on the subject are scarce and links with international historiography are still tenuous2.
Before the transition to democracy in!974, the few studies on the Portuguese 
authoritarian experience were published by foreigners or by exiled academics and, 
therefore, suffer all the limitations arising from the fact that it was impossible to gain 
access to most of the documentary sources. When, towards the end of the seventies, 
Portuguese scholars came into contact with international research on Fascism, the debate 
was not easy. Most of the works on the subject, regardless of the theoretical perspective 
to which they adhered (including Marxism), tended to exclude Salazar and his regime 
from the "Fascisms”. The Portuguese, on the other hand, thought that the fact that the 
"New State" was not included in the "family" was clearly ill will, probably caused by 
ignorance. One could read through works on European Fascism and find no reference to 
Portugal at all or find separate ones under the heading of "authoritarian" regimes. 
Empirical ignorance was certainly one of the factors but the main theoretic factor 
prevailed.
From the fifties on, the theories on totalitarianism created a school in the 
dominant sectors of North American political science and influenced a considerable 
number of studies on Fascism3. German National Socialism, a counterpoint to the Soviet 
model, was the nearest regime to the totalitarian ideal type, with Hitler's charismatic 
leadership, a single party which was the sole source of ideology, aiming at conquering 
the state, framing society with the aid of institutionalized terrorism. Italian Fascism,
2 Cf. M. V. Cabral, "História e Politica nas Cièncias Sociais Portuguesas: 1880-1980” and Luis Salgado 
de Matos, "Generalidade e Drama: Pensamento Politico Portuguès,1945-1980”, in Bolivar Lamounier 
(org. ), A Ciència Politica nos Anos 80, (Brasilia: 1982), pp. 251/280 e pp. 281/305; Manuel Braga da 
Cruz and Manuel de Lucena "Introdurlo ao desenvolvimento da ciència politica nas universidades 
portuguesas”, Revista de Ciència Politica, Lisboa, 2' semestre de 1985, n! 2, pp. 5/41; and Jo2o B. Serra, 
"Os Estudos sobre o Século XX na Historiografia Portuguesa do Pós-Guerra", Penèlope ns 5,1991, pp. 
111/147.
3 Cf. H. Arendt, The Origins o f Totalitarianism, (New York: 1951) and Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew 




























































































according to the ideological parents of this school was merely "imperfect totalitarianism" 
and the other dictatorships of the thirties were excluded from their research, so far 
removed were they from totalitarianism. While Franco's regime was mentioned 
occasionally, the Portuguese regime did not even merit a footnote.
When the theory of totalitarianism was tested by empirical research in the sixties 
and the first works written by historians appeared on the subject, their primary concern 
was to delimit the use of the term Fascism which in the sixties had been abused and used 
on every continent to characterize Right-wing dictatorships. This double task of 
conceptual demarcation and historical research only marginally included the "New State" 
and the reasons for this are easy to see. Reacting against the generalization of the term, 
the historians of the sixties tried to identify what was unique and innovative about the 
syncretic European Fascist movements and the factors that brought about the rise of 
fascism after the First World War. These movements represented something new and 
unexpected in post-war Europe and were not mere vestiges of the anti-liberal movements 
of the 19th century, either as ideologies or political parties.
Subsequent research was carried out on the movements. It tried to individualize 
their capacity for mobilization and penetration of the atmosphere of social crisis caused by 
the First World War and their ability to captivate considerable groups of the popular 
electorate. The strategies, at the same time revolutionary (or counter-revolutionary) and 
electoral, that these new political formations used successfully to subvert the liberal order 
in Germany and Italy were not successful in other European countries. As some 
important studies, such as those by Renzo De Felice on Mussolini and the comparative 
studies by Ernst Nolte, quite rightly tried to explain, the same did not happen in Portugal. 
Here, no Fascist movements of any significance were created and the liberal republican 
regime was overthrown in 1926 by a classic military coup.
One of the keys to the success of this anti-democratic political mobilization lay in 
the themes used by Fascist propaganda, based on a syncretic and extremely fluid 
ideology, using elements from many different sources. The Fascism of the twenties 
claimed to be anti-capitalist, caricatured the plutocratic bourgeois with a cigar and Jewish 
features. It brandished nationalist mythology against "Red” internationalism, and 
separated itself from the traditional, Catholic, monarchic conservatism of the 19th 
century. The leaders of this combination had a wide variety of political backgrounds. 
Mussolini came from the Socialist Party; the élite of National Socialism did not come 
from the Conservative Parties. There was a little of everything: Sorelian syndicalists who 
came from Marxism; futurists exalting an industrial society and war; intellectual critics of 





























































































Most historians ignored the case of Portugal, associating the ideological origins 
of Salazar and his regime almost exclusively with the Catholic traditionalist conservatism 
which emerged at the end of the 19th century, without any of the distinguishing elements 
which characterized the novelty of Fascism compared to old counter-revolutionary 
political thought. It should not be thought that this exclusion was caused by any defence 
of or ideological association with the regime which was overthrown on 25th of April 
1974. Portugal's case was even excluded by the works of Marxist origin in the sixties up 
to the early seventies which tried to define the nature of Fascism. One could search 
through Nicos Poulantzas’ work and find not one mention of Portugal. The same applies 
to other studies in the same field like those of the Hungarian Mihaely Vajda or the 
Frenchman Roger Bourderon, to mention only those most quoted at the time.
The first collective work on Fascism which, not only for reasons of editorial 
convenience but also mainly for theoretical reasons, included Salazar's regime was 
published in Britain in 1968 by Stuart Woolf (the article on Portugal was written by 
Hermfnio Martins)4. The authors' concern was to find the elements that all the Right- 
wing dictatorships in Europe between the two World Wars had in common. However, 
even when writing about the regimes, the great specialists were still reluctant to include 
Portugal. According to most historians, Salazarism did not have the characteristics that 
distinguished Fascism from the classic dictatorships. It lacked charismatic leadership, a 
single party mobilizing the masses, an expansionist, warlike ideology and a totalitarian 
tendency. It was also doubtful whether Portuguese post-war society possessed the 
structural characteristics that led to the emergence of Fascism - rapid industrialization, the 
"massification" of political life, economic crisis and downward social mobility - and that 
was the reason for its capacity to attract social groups which, until then, had traditionally 
voted for the democratic and even socialist parties. On one hand, both Germany and Italy 
had one important factor in common: extremely recent political unification. Portugal, on 
the other hand, was a nation of long standing with no problems in that respect and the 
"New State" tended to be compared to regimes like that of Dolfuss in Austria or with the 
Eastern European dictatorships. The development of research on the dictatorships outside 
Europe from the beginning of the sixties led to the development and definition of an ideal 
type of "authoritarian regime" which would influence the historians of Fascism when 
they were faced with the problem of "classifications" and "typologies". Portugal, Spain 
and the above-mentioned regimes tended to be included in this category.
It is not surprising that the first researchers of the "strange" Portuguese case 
came in search of corporatism, of "social Catholicism", of colonialism and of the role of 
the military. A considerable number concentrated on the last two questions as the colonial




























































































war dragged on and presaged the political mobilization of those who had overthrown the 




























































































1. FASCISM: THE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
AND PORTUGUESE "NEW STATE"
The most significant collection of interpretations of Fascism arose during the 
sixties when research was conducted particularly by historians. References to Portugal 
were few and far between, which was significant from the point of view of Portugal's 
inclusion in interpretative debate5.
1.1 THE "EXCLUSION" OF THE "NEW STATE"
The main concern of the first historical works was that of "historicising" (excuse 
the pleonasm) the object, testing contemporary theories in the light of empirical research. 
The models of totalitarianism provided by Arendt or Seymour Lipsef s "middle classes” 
were now challenged by new research which began to divide the different phases of the 
movements and regimes into periods. The first attempts at definition, for example that of 
Ernst Nolte, were also made. Among the works typical of this period, some of the most 
important were Eugen Weber's on Action Française and its first generic work, a trilogy 
by Nolte and the collective volume edited by George L. Mosse in 19666. In Italy, the first 
volume of Mussolini’s monumental biography written by Renzo de Felice was published 
and was to cause considerable controversy7. Several years before, Stanley Payne had 
published the first work on the Spanish Falange 8.
More than Weber or Mosse, who were concerned with the revolutionary aspects 
of the movements, Nolte considered that Action Française was the French version of 
Fascism and was therefore closer to including the case of Portugal. However, when it 
came to defining the regimes, Nolte used a fairly restrictive criterion: "if the mere 
suppression of parties and freedom of the press were considered sufficient criterion for 
Fascism(...)'' he says, all the dictatorships of the period between the two World Wars
5 Vide as a general introduction Renzo De Felice, Le Interpretazione del Fascismo (Bari: 1969) and II 
Facismo. Les interpretazioni dei contemporanei e degli storici, (Bari: 1970). Stanley G. Payne’s, 
Fascism. Comparison and Definition, (Madison: 1980) is more analytical and up to date. On National 
Socialism vide Pierre Ayçoberry, La Question Nazi. Les interpretations du National Socialisme.1922- 
1975, (Paris: 1979) and Irwin Kershow, The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems o f Interpretation, 2nd. Ed., 
(London: 1989).
® Cf. Eugen Weber, Varieties o f Fascism (New York: 1964); Ernst Nolte, Three Faces o f Fascism (New 
York: 1964) and the especial number "International Fascism" from Journal o f Contemporary History, 
edited by George L. Mosse and Walter Laqueur, in 1966.
7 Renzo De Felice, Mussolini. Il revoluzionario, 1883-1920, (Torino: 1965).




























































































would be included, but they lacked one much more distinctive characteristic: "popular 
support and a potential single party."9. The absence of Fascist and party component in 
the overthrow in the liberal regime excluded Portugal. This half truth, half intuition was 
repeated systematically in almost all the international history manuals as a reason for not 
including Portugal.
Strange as it may seem, considering his position on the "Historikerstreit" at the 
end of the eighties, Nolte was the historian who was most inclined to include the 
Portuguese regime, as all the others tended to stress precisely the factors which did not 
exist here or which were of little social or political weight10. With this first generic 
definition of a "Fascist minimum", however, it would be difficult to include Portugal: 
"anti-Marxism, anti-Conservatism, charismatic leadership, an armed party and totalitarian 
aims". This led him to conclude a few years later that "Portugal should not (...) be 
considered a Fascist state”11. De Felice or Karl Dietrich Bracher, at that time, tended to 
deny the utility of a general concept and the former in particular fell back on the theory of 
"singularities”.
In his Varieties o f Fascism, Eugen Weber began an interpretative current which 
gave rise to an empirical production, which has been almost unstoppable up to the present 
day, mostly written by North Americans scholars but also followed by several (lesser) 
European works. Eugen Weber was more interested in the Fascist movements and their 
ideological origins and challenged their traditional, conservative, reactionary origins and 
emphasizes the composite nature of their ideology and contributions made by the trade 
union movement and the Left. He called to question the "counter-revolutionary" model, 
democratized the concept of revolution and widened it to include Fascism: "Under the 
surface, all sorts of ferments were working, both on the right and on the left"12. 
Furthermore, George L. Mosse said the same thing quite clearly in his introduction to 
International Fascism: "In our century two revolutionary movements have made their 
mark upon Europe: The various forms of Marxism, and the Fascist revolution"13.
Although he calls in question Seymour Lipset's rigid classification of extremist 
movements, in his introduction to The European Right published in 1965, Eugen Weber 
does not dispute the place of Salazar's regime. Lipset defined Fascism as a radicalism of 
the center based, socially, on the middle classes and included Salazarism in the field of 
Right-wing radicalism together with regimes like that of Dolfuss or the Maurras 
movement. These tried to change the political institutions in order to preserve or restore
9 Cf. Ernst Nolte, Op. Cit., pp. 3/21.
Cf. the articles of Nolte in, AA VV, Historikerstreit, (München: 1987).
11 Ernst Nolte, Les Mouvements Fascistes. L'Europe de 1919 à 1945, (Paris: 1969), p. 339.
12 Cf. Eugen Weber, Op. Cit., p. 24.
13 Cf. George L. Mosse, "Toward a General Theory of Fascism", George L. Mosse (Edited by), 




























































































cultural or economic institutions, while central or left-wing extremism tried to use 
political means to bring about a social and cultural revolution14. While reminding Lipset 
that Salazarism was never a movement, Eugen Weber recognizes that he merely "devoted 
himself to what we may call the party of resistance"15.
Other works were written about the most varied aspects of the ideology and 
cultural origins of Fascism and its relative attractions for the intellectual élites. George L. 
Mosse conducted exhaustive research into the nationalism, racism and even the political 
choreography of the movements and introduced the problem of the "nationalization of the 
masses"16. The central themes of cultural history were introduced basically by these 
authors and most of the more recent research from historians like A. James Gregor to 
Emilio Gentile and Zeev Stemhell followed in their wake17. Even if the same 
perspectives, above all regarding ideological origins, could be applied, there is no doubt 
that the horizons opened by these historians made Portugal’s case not only uninteresting, 
since it was on the periphery and also repetitive, but above all commonplace since the 
traditionalist, Catholic factor was predominant. There was no special problem to solve 
here.
As far as the movements are concerned, there was now research which had a 
much stronger empirical foundation in their social bases and political strategies. Some 
works drew attention to the diversity of the phenomenon and to the great differences 
between the societies in which these movements grew successfully. This was the case of 
most of those that emerged in Eastern Europe, like the Iron Guard18. Ignorance of 
Portugal's case was not only a question of "power" in the research, of scorn for its 
smallness, as the academic industry continued to take stock of everything, even the most 
insignificant detail. F. L. Carson, in one of the first general works, gave the reason: "The 
Dictatorships of Portugal (...) were not established by the advance and ultimate triumph 
of Fascist parties; but they represent a much more old-fashioned and conservative type of 
Dictatorship similar to those which had existed in the Iberian Peninsula - and elsewhere - 
in earlier decades. Although these Dictatorships were influenced by the rise of Fascism in 
Italy and Germany and show certain "Fascist' traits, their history has been omitted here
14 Cf. Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man: the social bases o f politics, (New York: 1959).
15 Cf. Eugen Weber, "introduction” in Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (Edited by), The European Right. 
A historical profile (Berkeley: 1965), p. 14.
16 Cf. George L. Mosse, The Crises of German Ideology: Intellectual origins o f the third reich, (New 
York: 1964); Masses and Man. Nationalist and fascist perceptions o f reality, (New York: 1980); The 
Nationalization of the Masses, (New York: 1975); Sexuality and Nationalism, (New York: 1985).
17 Cf. particularly A. James Gregor, The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics, (Princeton: 1974); 
Emilio Gentile, Le Origini dell'Ideologia Fascista , (Bari: 1975) and Zeev Stemhell, La Droite Radicale. 
Les origines françaises du fascisme.1885-1914, (Paris: 1978).
Cf. Eugen Weber,”The man of archangel", Journal o f Contemporary History, 1 (April 1966), pp. 





























































































because it differs in vital points from that of the Fascist movements in other European 
countries"19.
1.2 THE DEFINITION OF AN "IDEAL TYPE" OF "AUTHORITARIAN REGIME"
In 1964, the political scientist Juan Linz conceived an ideal type of "authoritarian 
regime" with regard to Francoism, which created a school in the historiography of 
European Fascism, as it gave substance to the differences observed and described by 
historians between the Nazi and Fascist regimes on the one hand and the other 
contemporary dictatorships20. In the classifications of political regimes which had been 
made until then, this group of regimes tended to be included in a third group, between the 
democracies and the totalitarian regimes. As early as 1958 Raymond Aron, for example, 
referred to "this third group of regimes", "based neither on electoral nor on revolutionary 
legitimacy", in which he included Salazarism, Francoism and the first phase of the Vichy 
regime21. Linz considered these regimes to be different and observed that this distinction 
helped to understand the different way in which they solved the problems common to all 
political regimes: maintaining control and acquiring legitimacy; recruiting élites; 
establishing and combining interests; making decisions and establishing relationships 
with the various institutional spheres from the armed forces to the religious bodies22.
" Authoritarian regimes are political systems with limited, not responsible, 
political pluralism: without elaborated and guiding ideology (but with distinctive 
mentalities); without intensive nor extensive political mobilization (except some points in 
their development); and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power 
within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones."23. It is worth both 
examining this definition here (as it will be quoted several times further on with regard to 
various authors and discussions) as well as focussing on the distinctive points which 
separate these regimes from their totalitarian cousins.
19 Cf. F. L. Carstein, The Rise o f Fascism, (Berkeley: 1967),p. 7/8.
29 Cf. Juan Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain", in Erik allardt and YrjO Littunen (edited by), 
Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems, (Helsinki: 1964). This article would latter be republished in 
several collective works. I have used the version published in Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (edited by), 
Mass Politics. Studies in Political Sociology (New York: 1970), pp. 251/283. The same author later 
developed his typology in "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes" in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby 
(Edited by), Handbook of Political Science, (Reading,Mas.: 1975), vol. 3, pp. 175/411.
21 Cf. Raymond Aron, Sociologie des Sociétés Industrielles. Esquisse d'une théorie des regimes 
politiques (Paris: 1958), p. 50.
22 Cf. Juan Linz,"An Authoritarian Regime...", p. 255.




























































































Juan Linz understands "limited pluralism" to mean the survival of interest 
groups, political and religious associations etc. to a variable degree, which contrasts with 
"the strong domination, if not monopoly, imposed by the totalitarian party after 
conquering power;!...)"24. Unlike the strong ideological component with all its utopian 
functions which characterizes totalitarianism, the authoritarian regimes do not have 
codified, instrumental guidelines. Linz prefers to speak of "mentalities" when referring to 
the cases of Portugal, Spain, Austria and France and wonders whether, given the well- 
defined presence of "social Catholicism”, one could not use the concept of ideology in 
these cases. Another distinctive characteristic is the absence of "the extensive and 
intensive political mobilization of the population" by the regime after it becomes 
established. Political militancy is weak and participation in the regime's organizations, the 
case of the single party or para-military organizations, is very limited. In some phases, 
the regimes themselves encourage depoliticization.
The single party, if it exists, plays a much more limited role. It does not carry 
out the usual functions of totalitarian parties: it does not monopolize the access to power, 
it is not the guardian of the ideology, it does not try to conquer the state. In general, its 
organization is diffused and bureaucratic and it is only one of the regime's several 
institutions, without any particular prominence, often being formed after power has been 
taken and agglomerating different tendencies. Quoting Max Weber, the place of the 
authoritarian regimes is also more diffused and represents "a mixture of legal, charismatic 
and traditional authority."25.
This definition was later developed by political science research, above all Latin 
American specialists, and had considerable influence on comparative historiography of 
Fascism. It continued up to the current discussion and can invariably be found in all the 
classifications of the regimes in the period between the two World Wars26. Let us not 
forget, either, that a large part of the research on contemporary Portugal came from this 
school and, in some cases, previous experience was related to this geographical area.
From then on the Portuguese "New State" emerged as an example of an 
authoritarian variation in almost all the works which founded modem political science27. 
Even though the case of Portugal was not the subject of important research until the 
seventies, references to it became more frequent both when classifying party systems and 
examples of military intervention and also the crisis and fall of liberal democratic
24 Idem, p. 256.
25 Idem, p. 269.
26 For an analysis of the use of this definition by Spanish historians vide, Javier Tusell, La dictadura de 
Franco, (Madrid: 1988), pp. 86/110.





























































































regimes28. Many of these references, not counting those based on superficial analysis, 
err due to what, for want of a better term, can be called lack of sensitivity to the time 
factor, which is particularly important in this case considering how long the regime 
lasted. The problem of the role of the single party is an example. In Authoritarian Politics 
in Modern Society, Clement H. Moore recognizes that " The Fascist model influenced the 
Dictator's search for legitimacy, but the party was even less autonomous than the 
Falange. For Salazar continued to rely primarily upon the conservative groups that put 
him in power. As a result, legitimacy, what there is of it, rests on other grounds”29. If 
this is true, it may lead us to underestimate the role of the National Union in the 
institutionalization of the regime, after the military dictatorship. We could make the same 
comment to Giovanni Sartori who in Parties and Party Systems, when defining his 
tripartite classification of the single party regimes - totalitarian, authoritarian and 
pragmatic - places "pre-1974 Portugal" in the third category30.
In the field of political history, for those who did not deny the validity or the 
value of a com parative study of the regim es, th is dichotom y - 
totalitarianism/authoritarianism - persisted. From the end of the sixties there was more 
and more criticism, some of which totally excluded the dichotomy (especially 
totalitarianism) but possibly the greater part "historicized" and divided into phases the 
application of these concepts to the study of the German and Italian regimes31. However, 
in general, the dichotomy was accepted by all non-Marxist and even some Marxist 
historians throughout all efforts at comparison32. In the light of this dichotomy, Italian 
Fascism was a sensitive case in view of the relative lack of success of the totalitarian 
component of the regime, as recognised by Stanley G. Payne, but the discussion 
continued and regarding its fall, Giuseppe Di Palma spoke of a double legacy33.
French political historians, who were much more self-centered, took a similar 
view. The school of René Rémond was based on a fairly restricted concept of Fascism34.
28 Cf. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (Edited by), The Breakdown o f Democratic Regimes, (Baltimore: 
1978).
29 Cf. Clement H. Moore, "The Single Party as Source of Legitimacy" in Samuel P. Huntington and 
Clement H. Moore (Edited by), Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society, (New York: 1970), p. 52.
311 Cf. Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems-A framework for analysis (Cambridge: 1976), p. 224.
31 Cf. as a summary of some of these critiques at the end of the seventies, Ernst A. Menze (edited by), 
Totalitarianism Reconsidered, (Port Washington: 1981). Of especial interest are those of K. D. Bracher 
and of Hans Mommsen ("the concept of totalitarianism dictatorship versus the comparative theory of 
fascism"). The latter rejects its use.
32 Vide, Karl Dietrich Bracher, Controversias de Historia Contemporanea sobre Fascismo, Totalitarismo 
y Democracia, (Barcelona: 1983); Karl Dietrich Bracher and Leo Valani (A Cura Di), Fascismo e Nacional 
Socialismo, (Bologna: 1986), as an example of the recent historians' insistant use of the concept of 
totalitarianism.
33 Cf. Giuseppe Di Palma, "Italy: Is There a Legacy and Is It Fascist ?” in John H. Herz (Edited by), 
From Dictatorship to Democracy. Coping with the Legacy o f Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism, 
(Westport: 1982), pp. 107/134.



























































































According to Rémond "Fascism is a very different phenomenon from the classic 
rightwing regimes" and he uses precisely the Portuguese regime to illustrate the 
difference. Even when he reviewed his classic work of the fifties, he still maintained that 
it was "obvious that Salazar's Portugal does not belong to the category. The "New State" 
of the Portuguese dictator, owing to its strictly clerical nature, its typically reactionary 
politics, was closer to Mettemich's Austria and the reactionary principalities of the 19th 
century than to Mussolini's Italy"35.
The model persisted and became stronger in the manuals as this discussion of 
the central and peripheral cases continued
1.3 FASCISM AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF MODERNIZATION
The theories produced by the sociology of modernization may have brought 
about the appearance of more inspiring models for the analysis of the case of Portugal 
and its inclusion in a general theory of Fascism36. This would be noticed several years 
later by Portuguese research just when it was under attack from various quarters and its 
greatest exponents were abandoning this approach.
The variables of stages of development and industrialization, and of the conflicts 
inherent in the transition to industrial capitalism, were introduced into the analysis of the 
political system. These models were much more susceptible to the dynamics of historical 
change and several authors tried out genetic models on the Fascist regimes. As Organski 
said: " It seems clear that the study of Fascist political systems is best approached from an 
interdisciplinary point of view, for it is necessary to explore the complex and ramified 
linkages among three different patterns of change: economic development, social 
mobilization, and political mobilization. No nation develops in such a fashion that all 
regions and all aspects of national life keep in step with all the rest."37.
Worth of note among the various sociologists involved in this area and who 
touched on the subject of Fascism are Barrington Moore Jr., Gino Germani and Organski 
(quoted above)38. As far as our work is concerned, Organski is the most important. He 
begins his model with three patterns which characterize the period preceding the Fascist
35 Cf. René Rémond, Les Droites en France, 4° ed, (Paris: 1982), p. 202.
36 Cf. David Apter, The Politics of Modernization, (Chicago: 1965) and A. F. K. Organski, The Stages 
of Political Development (New York: 1965).
37 Cf. A.F.K. Organski, "Fascism and modernization", in S. J. Woolf (Edited by), The Nature of 
Fascism, ( New York: 1968), p. 20.
38 Cf. Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the 



























































































takeover of power: 1- dear economic growth; 2- Large scale social mobilization with a 
considerable component of rural to city migration; 3- Vast and rapid political 
mobilization, particularly before the Fascists take power. The first conflict between the 
modem and traditional sectors is based on the modem sector's tendency to expand at the 
expense of the traditional sector and an increasingly dual economy and society develop in 
which the political system is the main, though insufficient, link between the two 
extremes. The second conflict is between the classes and is reflected in the "aggressive 
posture of the newly mobilized masses frightening the élites (and other strata) who 
respond(...)", both the modem and traditional sectors, joining forces against it.
The point at which a given society is situated in the continuum of the 
modernization process is central to the emergence of Fascism, because "compromise is 
the core of the political system" which Organski calls Fascist. If the modem sector was 
already the more powerful of the two, why the compromise? In this way, any possibility 
of the phenomenon appearing in societies which are already highly industrialized or still 
predominantly agrarian is excluded. Fascism could only develop in societies on the 
turning point in this transition process.39
Observation of the way in which, once they were installed, the regimes dealt 
with this double conflict helps us to understand its function. On one hand, political power 
is used vigorously "to protect the non-modem portion from the incursions of the modem 
sector", with a series of measures to protect the agrarian sector. On the other hand, while 
making concessions and sometimes subsidizing the process of industrial development, its 
main contribution to the modern sector is to keep the industrial workers under strict 
control. "The modem sector may continue to grow but it must pay most of its bills"40. 
This movement led, in general, to practically zero industrial development. In short, the 
Fascist formula consisted of reinforcing the threatened traditional élites and together with 
the modem élites resisting the pressures "from below", thus allowing the modem élites, 
to a certain extent, to consolidate their position at the expense of a reduction in 
consumption.
By including the political systems in their functions in the modernization 
process, Organski makes the political choreography and ideology relative. Political 
mobilization, in Fascism, is highly symbolic and fulfils one purpose: "disciplining the 
masses into an attitude of obedience in which non-participation in decision-making is 
taken for granted and becomes a virtue, and of further disciplining them into an attitude 
receptive to making sacrifices"41. Ideology is a simple "device" by which the élites 
legitimize the interests of their way of life. The great analytical advantage of Organski's
39 A. F. K. Organski, Op.Cil., p. 30.
40 Idem, p. 32.




























































































model was also its dynamic approach. "Fascism" - he concluded - "is part of a process of 
transition from a limited participation to a mass system, and Fascism is a last-ditch stand 
by the élites, both modem and traditional, to prevent the expansion of the system over 
which they exercise hegemony. The attempt always fails and in some ways the Fascist 
system merely postpones some of the effects it seeks to prevent."42.
Although working along the same lines as Organski, Barrington Moore was 
more sensitive to diversity but also recreated confusion by including Nazi Germany. As 
far as Germani is concerned, his main contribution referred to the means for social 
mobilization in the framework of the transition to political massification43. Some of his 
suppositions were discussed later, in the eighties, by Portuguese researchers and will be 
analysed below.
The contribution made by the sociology of modernization left its mark on 
research into the Fascist regimes. However, as a number of works published later 
showed, the discussion of the modernizing or anti-modernizing nature of the German and 
Italian regimes continued44. From the end of the seventies, historians stopped mentioning 
these authors and the problem of "modernization" was excluded from more recent 
discussions.
1.4 THE MARXIST CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE TIME
Although they were very sensitive to the dynamics of social change and 
underestimated merely political classifications, the models discussed above were distinct 
from the Marxist analyses. Organski wrote that "the Marxists are wrong when they claim 
that Fascism is a creature of the bourgeoisie. As we have seen, syncratic systems 
represent an attempt by the agricultural élite to slow the pace of industrialization and to 
control its consequences"45. This demarcation was rather forced as it is doubtful whether 
they were not bourgeois.
The Marxist-inspired contributions were perhaps the most important of the 
contemporary analyses of Fascism and it would be pointless to count them in all their
42 Idem, p. 41.
43 Vide, apart from his contribution to The Nature of fascism, Gino Germani, Autoritarismo, Fascismo e 
Classi Sociali, (Bologna: 1975).
44 Cf. on the debate, Henri A. Turner, Jr., "Fascism and modernization" in Henri A. Turner Jr. (edited 
by), Reappraisals o f Fascism, (New York: 1975), pp. 117/139, for a version of Nazism as an "anti- 
modernizing utopia" and, as a version of Italian fascism as a modernizer, A. J. Gregor, Italian Fascism 
and Developmental Dictatorship (Princeton: 1979).




























































































diversity46. The most important contributions to mention here are those written in the 
sixties and seventies. The choice of subjects, giving pride of place to the role of the 
movements, was the main factor which led, once again, to the exclusion of the case of 
Portugal. The fact that the Marxist studies concentrated on the central cases (Germany 
and Italy) was not the cause of this, as many of the works made reference to and were 
inspired by peripheral regimes like that of Peron, for example in theories on populism 
and Fascism47.
The priority was obvious at a time when the most important thing seemed to be 
to face up to the interpretative challenge of the less linear aspects of the Fascist 
phenomenon: that Fascism was a popular, middle class movement; its relative break with 
with the traditional élites; the relative autonomy of politics in relation to the economy and, 
above all in the case of Germany, the importance of the ideological factor which no 
Marxist analysis of the thirties came close to anticipating. For example, what was 
important was to find out how and why there was "one social order in which Hitler was 
unable to rise beyond the rank of corporal and fifteen years later another in which he was 
the central figure of a process of reconstruction of power"48. Among the authors typical 
of that time, we find Nicos Poulantzas and Mihaely Vajda49.
Vajda introduces his opinion right in the first paragraph: "The definitive 
character of Fascist dictatorship is that it sprang from a mass movement and, as a 
capitalistic form of rule, depended on this movement for support. It was the leaders and 
participants of the movement, not bourgeois politicians, who assumed the power 
functions of the dictatorship. (...) there is a widespread view that every anti-democratic 
form of capitalist rule after the first world war must be regarded as Fascist, and so one 
might expect it necessary to prove that the Italian and German dictatorships were 
characterised by different traits from those of all other dictatorships at the time, in order 
subsequently to ascribe any importance at all to the Fascist movement itself."50. He 
sticks to this assumption and sets about proving it, with some stimulating arguments.
According to Otto Bauer and Clara Zetkin, some similar traits between the other 
dictatorships and Fascist regimes were evident, but any confusion between the two was 
rejected. Referring to Francoism, Vajda considered that it belonged to another family and
40 Almost all the interpretative works include them. For a detailed anthology of the analyses of the 
period between the two world wars cf., David Beetham, Marxists in Face o f Fascism, (Manchester 1983).
47 As we will see below, I do not mean that the subject of populism was not important to the analysis 
of the crisis of liberalism in Portugal where the dictatorship of Siddnio Pais is the most obvious 
example.
4^ Cf. Jules Monnerot, Sociologie de la Révolution: mythologies politiques du XX siècle, marxistes- 
leninistes et fascistes, la nouvelle stratégie révolutionnaire, (Paris: 1969), p. 495.
40 Cf. Nicos Poulantzas, Fascisme et Dictature: La Troisième International face au Fascisme , (Paris: 
1970) and Mihaly Vajda, Fascism as a Mass Movement, (London: 1976), originally published in 1970.




























































































for reasons which are not unsimilar to those we have already mentioned: the traditional 
élites were not denied the exercise of power; the radical demands of the masses were not 
satisfied, as it was typically counter-revolutionary power; no aggressive foreign policy 
was developed51. One can imagine what would be said of Portugal's case, when seen 
from this point of view.
The works of Nicos Poulantzas also deal with the subject under discussion. In 
his writing on Fascism, Poulantzas concentrates on criticism of the visions of the Third 
International and on emphasizing the petit-bourgeois nature of the movements and the 
relative autonomy of the Fascist power with regard to the dominant classes and the role of 
the mobilization of the masses52. Poulantzas does not adhere to the theories on 
totalitarianism that separated the case of Germany from that of Italy and classifies them 
together as "regimes of exception" but excludes the other dictatorships, viz that of Spain. 
In a later work on the crisis and fall of the Portuguese, Spanish and Greek authoritarian 
regimes, one of his initial assumptions is that they were not "Fascist in the strict sense of 
the word"53.
The influence of these authors on the historiography of Fascism, even that 
written by Marxists, was relative54. Basically historians were more concerned with 
reinserting the phenomenon as a phase in the history of the development of capitalism 
and, although they did not touch on the peripheral cases, they tended to defend the 
existence of a "generic Fascism". This is the case of German Marxist historiography, of 
which the work of Reinhard Kuhnl can be considered an example, and above all of Italian 
Marxist historiography. However, although they based their work on the same 
assumption, several studies re-evaluated the importance of ideology and its functions in 
the field of political action55. It was precisely on the subject of German Nazism that 
British Marxist historiography distinguished itself from the ordinary economism that was 
still dominant in this field. Tim Mason's contribution to The Nature o f Fascism had the 
significant title "The Primacy of Politics" and was an important milestone56. "The 
existence of an autonomous political realm with is own self-determining laws is usually 
denied by Marxist historians (...)”, this, according to Mason seems to be the case of the 
Nazi regime. "(...) both domestic and foreign policy of the National Socialist government
51 Idem, p. 14/15.
52 Cf., Nicos Poulantzas, Op. Cit, pp. 237/258 and 331/356.
53 Cf. Idem, La Crise des Dictatures, (Paris: 1975). I have used the English version, (London: 1976), p. 
9.
54 For a critique of Poulantzas1 analytical work from the point of view of Marxist historiography, cf. 
Jane Caplan, " Theories of Fascism: Nicos Poulantzas As Historian", in Michael N. Dobkowski and 
Isidor Wallimann (Ed. By), Radical Perspectives on the Rise of Fascism in Germany, 1919-1945, (New 
York: 1989), pp. 128/149.
55 Vide, Roger Bourderon, Le Fascisme. Idéologie et pratiques (essai d'analyse comparée), (Paris: 1979).
56" Cf. T. W. Mason, " The primacy of politics - political and economics in National Socialist Germany" 




























































































became, from 1936 onwards, increasingly independent of the influence of economic 
ruling classes and even in some essential aspects ran contrary to their interests. This 
relationship is, however, unique in the history of modem bourgeois society and its 
governments; it is precisely this that must be explained."57.
In general, it is this relationship that the more innovative sector of Marxist 
historiography sets out to find, as in the case of the authors mentioned above. Tim Mason 
mentioned many examples in which "an ideologically determined policy triumphed over 
economic calculation”58.
1.5 BETWEEN "CLERICO-CORPORATIST" AND "CLERICO-FASCIST"
In 1967, some of the authors mentioned above met in a series of seminars in 
Reading59. When reading the reports of the debates it is curious to note that, although 
research advanced overwhelmingly up to the eighties, the basis of the interpretative 
debate has made no significant progress since then. The relative lack of communication 
between the areas involved was evident: historians contested the applicability of the 
models given by sociologists and political scientists. The differences between the 
defenders of a "generic Fascism" as a form of regime and the defenders of more restricted 
criteria and between the relative weights of the political, ideological and economic factors 
came to the fore60.
Some authors, basing their calculations on various specific aspects of the 
dictatorships of Dolfuss and Salazar and giving particular weight to corporatism and the 
Catholic church in both regimes, began to call them "clerico-Fascist”, "clerico- 
corporatist" or "semi-Fascist". These definitions, attributed only by historians, belong, in 
my opinion, to the realm of confusion since, not only do they not mention any aspect 
which distinguishes them from other experiences, they also have a very limited analytical 
dimension. When referring to Portugal, Charles F. Delzell characterizes it, on the same 
page, as "semi-Fascist", "clerico-corporatist" and "authoritarian"61. Henri Michel, when 
writing about Portugal and Austria, used the term "clerico-Fascism”62. Neither of them 
contributes anything new to what we have already described, as both of them emphasize 
the same traits.
57 Mem, p. 167.
58 Idem, p. 192.
59 These meetings gave rise to the works already mentioned above, edited by Stuart Woolf.
60 Cf. S. J. Woolf, Op. Cit., pp. 51/61, 104/115, 196/202 and 245/252.
01 Cf. Charles F. Delzell, Mediterranean Fascism. 1919-1945, (New York: 1970), p. 331.




































































































































































































































































































































































































2. THE FIRST STUDIES ON THE PORTUGUESE "NEW STATE'
Stanley G. Payne in an interpretative examination published in 1980 spoke of 
the beginning of research into Portuguese authoritarianism63. For the first time Stuart 
Woolfs work included a contribution on the "New State". Although he does not go into 
detail on the characterization of the regime, from then on Hermfnio Martins became a 
source systematically quoted by historians. Another article was written by the same 
author in 1970 on the crisis and overthrow of the liberal republican regime but had a more 
limited circulation as it was never published. It was mentioned years later, however, in 
several works64.
The first empirical works on the "New State" appeared between 1968 and 1974 
and began a number of interpretations based on empirical research. These works were 
basically situated in the field of political science and sociology and their authors were 
mainly North American, generally specialists on Latin America, or Portuguese exiles 
working in the same fields. Some pioneer studies on the First Republic, of a more 
academic nature, were written in the same period and introduce the subject of the origins 
of authoritarianism. A. H. Oliveira Marques, a Portuguese historian who taught in the 
U.S.A., was not only responsible for most of these works but also wrote the first history 
of Portugal to include an introduction to the Salazar regime65.
2.1 GENERIC INTERPRETATIONS
Some authors attempted a generic interpretation of the "New State" and the crisis 
of the Portuguese liberal regime, although they sometimes studied only partial aspects.
2.1.1 The Fall of Liberalism and the "New State" in Comparison
63 Cf. Stanley G. Payne, Op. Cil., pp. 157/160. Vide also his more recent "Fascism and Right 
Authoritarianism in the Iberian World: the last Twenty Years", Journal o f Contemporary History, voi. 
21(1986), pp. 163/177.
64 Namely by Juan Linz and Philippe Schmitter, vide infra.
Cf. A. H. de Oliveira Marques, "Revolution and Counterrevolution in Portugal. Problems of 
Portuguese history, 1900-1930", Studien uber die Revolution, (Berlin: 1969), pp. 403/418; "the 
Portuguese 1920s: a general survey", paper presented to the V ISSA Annual Conference, Nottingham, 
1972, published latter in Revista de História Econòmica e Social, n° 1, Janeiro-Junho 1978, pp. 87/103; 




























































































In "The Breakdown of the Portuguese Democratic Republic", Hermfnio Martins 
proposed a "non-deterministic" model on the fall of the First Republic and emphasized 
the possible "margins of choice" of the political élites, approaching it from a comparative 
point of view66.
He drew attention from the start to the relative "life expectancy" of the republican 
regime in terms of the European average in the first half of the 20th century. It was a 
republic which was also precocious in the "destabilization" of relations with the Catholic 
church (immediately after France) with emphasis on the role of anti-clericalism which 
was the "lowest common denominator" of the republican movement. The structural 
factors of the Portuguese economy and Portuguese society which could be plainly seen 
from indications like the distribution of the active population (60% in the primary sector), 
urbanization (10,5%), illiteracy (70%) did not help the formation of a "political culture" 
corresponding to the republican aims. In spite of this picture of an underdeveloped 
economy, with 60% of the population in agriculture, no "peasant" or "agrarian" parties 
emerged here, unlike in Northern and Eastern Europe.
An indication of the politization of the literate minority was the veritable 
"communications explosion" at the beginning of the century, connected with the 
republican movement and visible in the press figures : 1 newspaper per 6.500 inhabitants 
in 1900, which, as he stressed, did not mean "botanical society" periodicals67. "Dual 
society" without doubt, but less divided than one would expect, where the Republican 
Party, hegemonic at an urban level, was a sufficiently attractive machine for the rural 
caciquism, and "acquired a "double" structure and a "double" clientele noncompetitive yet 
asymmetric ideological orientations"68. This factor was reflected in the obvious absence 
of decisions in the agrarian sector.
In spite of the patterns of political violence and social conflict which preceded 
the war, it was Portugal's entry into the First World War and the consequent crisis that 
brought about the turning point in the life cycle of the republic which was obvious in the 
dictatorship of Sidonio Pais, which Hemunio Martins indicates as the first European 
experience of a corporatist and charismatic dictatorship. Understandable, both in terms of 
the " mass society" (with the sudden entry of the as yet uncultured masses into urban 
industrial life) and in terms of "political bargaining" (a weak working class wanting some 
economic dividends and using the threat of violence), the fact is that, at the beginning of 
the twenties, Lisbon was very like Barcelona in terms of social violence and was not far 
below the average experienced in recent years in other liberal democracies. On the Right,
66 Cf. "The Breakdown of the Portuguese Democratic Republic”, Mimio., Seventh World Congress of 
Sociology, Varna, 1970, p. 3. Most of the papers presented at this session, organised by Stein Rokkan 
and by Juan Linz, produced the collective work The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, quoted above.
67 Idem, p. 7.




























































































however, there were some differences. Here the correspondents of Action Française did 
not create "Camelots du Roi" (all attempts at this failed) but did have a growing 
ideological influence on the army.
Hermfnio Martins enumerates some indications of immediate predecessors to the 
coup of 28th May 1926. Order was being restored in the social field. The economic 
pointers were neither stagnant nor in regression. In the political field instability 
continued. Relations with the army (almost always bad) grew worse after the war and the 
"entente of monarchists and right-wing republican officers which had been essayed in 
1917-18 was tried again with more determination and persistence."69.
In his article about the "New State", Hermfnio Martins does not actually go into 
the problem of "interpretations" but not only does he provide an initial overall view of the 
origins and development of the regime, he also discusses some of the analytical models 
of the time70. Although he stresses that the three requirements of Fascism (represented 
here by National Syndicalism) were not accepted by Salazar ("Leadership is not 
charismatic in the usual sense associated with historic Fascist regimes, political support is 
not mobilized on a large scale, and the mechanism of political recruitment and succession 
have not been elaborated"71, in 1936 Hermfnio Martins sees "a new level of 
"Fascistization" of the regime, or at least a stage of political development which goes 
beyond the traditionalistic, conventionally authoritarian, Christian corporatist policy 
which was perhaps the initial "project" of the regime (and which is the dominant 
international stereotype).”72. Even though the "organizing complex" thus created 
underwent certain changes, the truth is that it survived and "cannot simply be regarded as 
a temporary aberration (...)"73.
2.1.2 "Fascism without a Fascist Movement"
In 1971 in his introduction to a thesis on the corporatist system of the "New 
State", Manuel Lucena put forward a comparative analysis of the regime which, though it 
made some historical and sociological references, derived basically from political 
classifications74. He expressed his definition of the regime in this formula: "a Fascism 
without a Fascist movement"75.
69 Mem, p. 20.
711 Included in the work of Stuart Woolf quoted above, this article was not included in the 2nd edition ( 
London: 1981). I have used the American edition, (New York: 1969), pp. 302/336.
71 Op. Cit., p. 332.
72 Idem, p. 322.
73 Idem, ibidem.
74 Cf. Manuel Lucena, A Evolugdo do Sistema Corporativo Portugues, Vol. I - 0  Salazarismo, (Lisboa: 




























































































Lucena did not accept the definition "generic Fascism", as he considered Nazism 
to be from a different family. He concentrated on the comparison of the institutions of the 
Italian and Portuguese regimes and concluded that they were alike as in no other case. 
Contrasting them with classifications which emphasize the basic similarities between 
Italian and German Fascism, Lucena denies that they are related, based precisely on the 
theory of totalitarianism to which, in his opinion, the former is close for the purposes of 
ideology but in reality is not close at all.
Italian Fascism and Salazarism were different in origin as their societies were 
different but both finally led to very similar forms of State. In Portugal, the single party 
hardly existed in reality but "absence is a form of existence" and its function was carried 
out: it justified the absence of all other parties and prevented the crystallization of 
tendencies in the heart of the regime. In Italy, the party was a reality of much greater 
importance and had totalitarian tendencies but did not go as far as the "Fascization" of the 
institutions and of Italian society and it became a "compromise" regime in which 
totalitarianism was nothing more than a whim. Lucena recognized the significant 
differences between the two regimes and pointed out that they arise from the absence of a 
movement in the Portuguese case since they were identical when it came to types of State: 
"Both were single-party dictatorships which put society and the state under the principal 
of class collaboration and were supported by an alliance of all the groups of the national 
bourgeoisie. In both, a single man was the undisputed leader of both the party and the 
state. In both, power was exceedingly centralized, relying on the police and the army and 
forbidding any legal opposition party. In both, corporatist organizations imprisoned 
social classes and professional groups within its web and monopolized their 
representation. Finally, both were conceived in terms of stubborn nationalism. These 
traits are those of Fascist states and Fascist corporatism anywhere.”75 6.
The political forms "do not depend strictly on their origins”. Just as there were 
many liberalisms without "taking the Bastille", the same could happen with Fascism. The 
differences pointed out between Portugal and Italy can be seen in the doctrine of the State 
and in the movement which, while important, is not essential. "To the extent that Fascism 
is a sui generis political form, to the extent that it must not be confused with traditional 
dictatorships and yet does not overlap with either liberalism or communism, to the extent 
that it creates unprecedented and stable institutions (a fact which is undeniable), Portugal
"Interpreta^Ses do Salazarismo: notas de leitura critica -I", Andlise Social, Voi. XX (83), 1984-4°, pp. 
423/451.
75 Cf. Op. Cit., p. 27.
7<> Cf. Manuel de Lucena, "The evolution of Portuguese corporatism under Salazar and Caetano" in 
Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler, Contemporary Portugal. The Revolution and its 




























































































had a Fascist regime"77. We should note that at the same time as Lucena refused to 
include National Socialism, he introduced a very wide definition of Fascism in which all 
the non-socialist dictatorships of the period could be included. On the other hand, in his 
comparison with the Italian Fascist regime, Lucena stresses that the comparison works if 
we consider the first phase of Mussolini's regime, up to the impact of the formation of 
the Rome-Berlin Axis.
2.1.3 The "Régime d'Exception" that Became the Rule
Different points of view, possibly more marked by the scientific situation of the 
time, were presented in some of the works of Philippe Schmitter who, in the same year, 
1971, went to Portugal to study the corporatist system78. Like the others who would 
follow him, Schmitter had come from Latin America, his previous field of research, but 
unlike many of them, he neither rushed into dubious comparisons with Latin America nor 
condemned the Iberian authoritarian regimes to a "future” conditioned by the corporatist 
"pattern"79. We will look at some of the conclusions in his studies of some of the 
regime's institutions later, but let us now examine his generic interpretation.
Although he used the theoretical literature on the "authoritarian regimes", 
Philippe Schmitter stressed that its static approach, in certain cases, made it impossible to 
observe their internal dynamics. Their very establishment "involved a great deal of 
uncertainty, experimentation, failure, coercion, and violence until something like a 
coherent interdependent institutional pattern emerged. More important, that pattern, once 
established, is also subject to the inexorable "law of uneven development."80. Part of the 
"secret" of the stability of the regime was the relatively slow development of these 
"desynchronizing" developmental variables which were mainly the "product of a 
deliberate policy". Between the thirties and the fifties Portugal had the lowest rates of
77 Cf. Idem, p. 71.
78 For the purpose of this analysis, we are interested above all in some of the articles presented at various 
conferences from 1972 onwards and published after the fall of the regime. Cf. Philippe C. Schmitter, 
"Corporatism and Public Policy in Authoritarian Portugal", Contemporary Political Sociological Series, 
Sage Professional Series, Vol. I, (London: 1975); "Liberation by Golpe: Retrospective Thoughts on the 
Demise of Authoritarian Rule in Portugal", Armed Forces and Society, vol. II, n°l, November 1975, pp. 
5/33; " The Impact and Meaning of "Non-competitive, Non-Free and Insignificant" Elections in 
Authoritarian Portugal. 1933-74", in Guy Hermet, Richard Rose and Alain Rouquié (Edited by), 
Elections Without Choice, (London: 1978), pp. 145/168; "The "Régime d'Exception" That Became the 
Rule: Forty-Eight Years of Authoritarian Domination in Portugal" in, Lawrence S. Graham and Harry 
Makler (Edited by), Contemporary Portugal. The Revolution and Its Antecedents, (Austin: 1979), pp. 
2/46.1 have used another version of this last article, published in Who were the Fascists, (Bergen: 1980), 
pp. 435/466.
79 Cf. his doctoral dissertation, Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil, (Stanford: 1971).




























































































urbanization, literacy, industrialization and economic development of all the European 
countries.81
After a brief incursion into the literature on the social bases and the economic 
and political factors which were at the basis of the authoritarian and Fascist solutions, 
Schmitter begins by stressing our already familiar lack of Fascist dynamism preceding the 
takeover of power. None of the groups of note in the First Republic was directly 
responsible for Salazar's takeover of power. Moreover, " While it would certainly be an 
exaggeration to claim that Salazar created authoritarian rule in Portugal tout seul et de 
toutes pièces, the evidence suggests that he played a very personal and imperious role in 
both the direction of policy after 1928 and the selection of personnel after 1932. Of 
course, he must have accommodated his choices to the demands and "advice" of various 
privileged classes, conservative and reactionary political forces, as well as those 
entrenched institutional actors, most notably the military and the church (...)", but "to an 
extraordinary degree Salazar could create from above the "élite" to which he felt the 
(New) state could or should be held accountable"82.
Beginning with the analysis of the composition of the Corporatist Chamber and 
the National Assembly in the first phase of the regime, representing the winning 
coalition, he stressed the importance of the bureaucrats and of their ties with the State 
(68%). On the other hand, "the gérontocratie image of the regime" in the sixties should 
not allow us to forget that Salazar's rise to power represented a new, fairly young 
generation. It is on the basis of these elements that Schmitter relates the "Fascization" of 
1935-36 as, although it introduced a more impressive dynamism, was not reflected by 
any change in the political élite. The most distinguishing characteristics of this founding 
élite were its youth, its dependence on public office and its close relationship with the 
financial and fiscal sector of the "weak and dependent Portuguese capitalist economy".
As far as the economic bases are concerned, Schmitter wonders if it is plausible 
to argue that the emergence and consolidation of authoritarian domination in Portugal 
corresponds to imperatives of a structural nature, of a crisis typical of a backward and 
dependent economy, and concludes that it does, he also points out, however, that this did 
not occur for the reasons most often given and emphasizes that Portugal was far from 
having exhausted the model of import substitution and the effect of her dependence on 
foreign countries is of little importance: witness the small impact of the 1929 crisis in 
Portugal. Some of the factors can be included in the problem of the financial crisis of the 
State. The economic situation on the eve of the fall of the liberal regime seems to suggest
81 Idem, p. 14.




























































































"the relative autonomy of the political factors” since it was not "the imminence of 
economic collapse" that caused the authoritarian wave83.
Schmitter was not far from Hermfnio Martins' opinions with regard to the 
factors that led to the fall of the liberal regime and said that, if, in retrospect, the transition 
process between military dictatorship and authoritarianism seemed calm, in reality it was 
very far from being so. " Armed insurrections, pronunciamentos, personal resignations 
and general strikes came from a wide variety of groups: some who had supported the 
1926 coup; some who had opposed it; some who felt the measures were going too far in 
destroying the nation's political life; others who felt that Salazar was not going far 
enough in establishing an integral, syndicalist-Fascist state."84.
In conclusion, Schmitter stresses that, if the emergence and consolidation of 
Portuguese authoritarianism was not "unique" in post-war Europe, the combination of 
these elements and the final product was quite distinctive. It lacked or deliberately 
avoided what, in other experiences, was called the "Fascist minimum.":
"In common with analogous Eastern European experiences, this form of 
conservative-bureaucratic authoritarian rule emerged in conjunction with a crisis of 
financial accumulation at a very early stage of capitalist development and a double crisis 
in the fiscal management and ideological hegemony of the liberal state. Many, if not 
most, of its cadres were recruited from within the state bureaucracy and the ideological 
apparatus of its universities, To the limited extent that mass support was involved, 
peasants, provincial mesoi and local notables on the geographic and social periphery of 
Portuguese society were "mobilized" against its more cosmopolitan, secular and 
developed center. The absence of linguistic or ethnic minorities, the weakness of a 
credible communist or proletarian threat, and the éloignement of Portugal from great 
power competition all contributed to moderating if not obliterating some of the 
scapegoating, xenophobia, violence and other extremist bizarreries which characterized 
authoritarian movements and regimes with similar social origins, economic functions and 
political imperatives elsewhere in Europe."85.
2.1.4 A "Centralized and Bureaucratic Empire"
Lawrence Graham centered his studies on administrative relations with the 
colonies and put forward a definition of the regime based on S. Eisenstadt's concept of a 
"centralized and bureaucratic empire"86. According to him, the "New State" could be
bittern, p. 454.
84Wem, p. 457.
85 Idem, p. 462.
86 Cf. Lawrence S. Graham, "Portugal: The Bureaucracy of Empire”, LADS Occasional Papers, Series 2, 




























































































classified as a contemporary version of this "centralized bureaucratic control with political 
struggle confined to the very same arenas, although without the institution of 
monarchy"87. Graham emphasized the importance of the state's administrative apparatus 
in relation to the really "political" institutions of Salazarism. After a purge of the elements 
attached to the clientelistic structure of the Republic’s parties, the dictator put his trust in 
bureaucracy, reigned over and used it, and the discrepancy between "the form and 
substance" of the regime became greater.
An example of this discrepancy was the well-known corporatist character of the 
regime, cultivated all the time in the official ideology but never put into practice, which 
leads him to conclude that "the reality under which Portugal was ruled from 1930 down 
to 1974 was that of an administrative state."88. The weight of the latter in the combination 
politics/govemment was developed later in partial research89
2.1.5 The Eastern European Dictatorships
Although Stanley G. Payne did no work on Portugal himself, he reviewed the 
research and referred to the "New State” in several comparative studies90. For Payne, the 
Portuguese regime belongs to the same category as the Eastern European dictatorships of 
the same period, "corporative, institutionalized, systematically authoritarian (...), without 
any direct Fascist party component"91. Referring to Manuel Lucena's definition, Payne 
considers that "the very precept of a "Fascism without a Fascist movement" indicates that 
we are dealing with a different phenomenon. "The Salazar regime was, in fact, one of the 
most fully institutionalized of all the interwar authoritarian regimes (partly explaining its 
longevity), for its structure, partly paralleling that of Italy, was more thoroughgoing than 
that of the Balkan or east-European regimes.", but it is here that we should look for 
elements of comparison, particularly with the Austrian regime of Dolfuss - 
Schuschnigg92.
Contemporary Political Sociological Series, (Beverly Hills: 1975). On this concept vide S. Eisentadt, 
The Political System o f Empire, (New York: 1963).
87 Cf. Lawrence S. Graham," Portugal:...", p. 8.
%%Idem, p. 15.
89 Cf. Paul H. Lewis, "Salazar's Ministerial Elite, 1932-1968", Journal o f Politics, 40, August 1978, 
pp. 622/647. Lewis focused attention on the predominance of technicians as opposed to politicians in 
Salazar's ministerial elite.
90 Cf. Stanley G. Payne, "Fascism in Western Europe" in Walter Laqueur (Edited by), Fascism: A 
Reader's Guide. Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography, (Berkeley: 1976), pp. 295/311; Fascism. 
Comparison and Definition (Madison: 1980), pp. 157/160 and "Salazarism:"fascism" or "bureaucratic 
authoritarianism" ?", AA VV, Estudos de Histôria de Portugal. Homenagem a A. H. Oliveira Marques, 
vol. II-sécs. XVI-XX, (Lisboa: 1983), pp. 523/531.
91 Cf. Stanley G. Payne, Fascism..., p. 157.




























































































Taking as undisputed fact that Salazar's regime was not based on the "culture of 
Fascism" or on a party of a similar nature but on that of Catholic corporatism, it is only at 
the level of certain characteristics of the state that we can find similarities with Italian 
Fascism. When looking at everything else (origins, culture, ideology and political base) a 
comparison shows nothing but differences93. In Payne's opinion it is only by using an 
extremely wide concept of Fascism including "all the forms of non-communist 
authoritarianism" that we can consider the Portuguese regime to be Fascist and if this is 
possible it becomes worthless and ineffective94. Avoiding hasty comparisons with the 
more recent Latin American dictatorships, Payne writes that the model of "bureaucratic 
authoritarianism" used to define them has some virtues for the study of those in the 
period between the two World Wars95.
2.2 SOME PARTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Some of the authors mentioned above, basically the political scientists, were 
concerned above all with studying the possible evolution of the regime after the political 
death of the dictator in 1968. The analysis of what they wrote in the years immediately 
before the fall of the regime would be an extremely interesting exercise on the foreseeable 
demands of political science.
The "Spring" of Marcello Caetano attracted a number of political scientists, most 
of them North American. In various conferences in 1973, some expressed great 
confidence in the longevity of the regime96. Others at the same time predicted important 
roles for the regime's own institutions (i.e. the corporatist institutions) faced with a 
possible liberalization. They were all wrong. As Philippe C. Schmitter wrote (in a self- 
critical summary, rare in the social sciences): "no scholarly or journalistic observer of 
Portugal foresaw the overthrow of Marcello Caetano, much less the rapid and complete 
collapse of authoritarian rule in Portugal. Quite the contrary.”97. Independently of these 
limits, a number of partial contributions began the study of various institutions of the
93 Stanley G. Payne, "Salazarism...", p. 527.
94 Idem, p. 530/531.
95 Vide about "bureaucratic authoritarianism" in Latin America, Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization 
and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley: 1973).
96 Vide some papers presented at the first Conference of the ICGMP, University of New Hampshire, 
October, 10/14,1973.




























































































regime, which was overthrown in the meantime, and opened the way for empirical 
research98.
2.2.1 The "Corporatist Revolution”
Corporatism was the field which attracted most research99. This seemed normal 
since corporatism had been one of the favorite subjects of the regime's own propaganda, 
to justify the originality of Portuguese authoritarianism and also because, of all the 
dictatorships of the same period which claimed it, the "New State" was the most stable of 
the time and, as Schmitter said, constituted an ideal "laboratory” for the purpose of 
analysis. Based on extremely varied theoretical concerns, all these studies presented new 
facts on the subject. Howard Wiarda's is, without doubt, the most controversial of them 
all100.
Right in his introduction Wiarda analyses the origins of Portuguese corporatism 
and includes them in an "Iberian - Latin" historical and cultural perspective101. According 
to him, these societies were structurally corporatist and the Anglo-Saxon mentality very 
often ignored this dimension, so he proposes to adopt an anthropological "cultural 
relativism" in his study. The legitimacy of this operation is highly dubious and the 
chapter on the history of Portuguese corporatism is a pure teleological exercise. Either 
Wiarda took seriously the ideological productions of the Integralists who, at the 
beginning of the 20th century, naturally tried to "re-invent" a corporatist tradition which 
liberalism, that "foreign" product, tried to destroy or he was highly influenced by the 
Latin American field from which he came102.
All the other studies on the subject quite correctly view the contemporary origin 
of the corporatist ideologies as authoritarian alternatives during the crisis of liberalism at 
the turn of the century, which in Portugal are no more "original” than those which 
developed in other European countries. Of all the scholars mentioned, Manuel Lucena 
was the most complete and provocative103.
Lucena began by analysing the place of corporatism in Salazar's political system 
and emphasized its secondary role among the institutions of the new regime. In
98 Ignoring analyses centered on the 1960's, I have given preference here to those conclusions either 
referring directly to the regime's first phase or having an important link with it.
99 C f ., apart the works of Manuel Lucena and of Philippe Schmitter, Howard J. Wiarda, Corporatism 
and Development. The Portuguese Experience, (Amherst: 1977).
11111 These works were debated in Antdnio Costa Pinto, ” La "Révolution Corporatiste" au Portugal- 
Entre Idéologie et Pratique", communication au séminaire Les Relations entre L'Etat et la Siciété Civil au 
XXe Siècle, IHTP-CNRS, Paris, 6/12/1988 (forthcoming).
1111 Cf. Howard J. Wiarda, Op. Cit., pp.2/28.Vide Manuel de Lucena ," Uma Leitura americana do 
corporativismo português”, Anâlise Social, vol. XVII (66), 1981-2°, pp. 415/434.
1112 Idem, pp. 29/54.




























































































opposition to the aspirations of the "Integral" corporatists in the formal apparatus, the 
liberal representative principles were maintained and this compromise was not particularly 
favourable to the corporatist institutions which continued in an inferior position. The 
Estatuto do Trabalho National, obviously inspired by Italy, made a very "catholic" 
change from its Fascist equivalent and, after the first wave of legislation in the thirties, 
the construction would never be completed and presented great differences in relation to 
the original plan. After the Sindicatos Nationals (national syndicates) were formed, 
under the strict control of the state, the "corporatization" of the employers' associations 
was much more moderate and served as a lever for economic intervention in certain 
sectors and allowed some organizations which resisted its control to continue to exist. It 
was only in the fifties that some "corporations" were formed, in a different situation and 
with hardly any capacity for decision-making or autonomy in contrast with the well- 
known "model” of association. Although different in many ways, Italian Fascist and 
Portuguese corporatism had some similar functions: "to tie down the workers' 
movement, develop national capitalism, re-inforce the state"104.
Schmitter has no doubt as to the role of social control of the corporatist system 
which aimed at "disarming and rendering dependent upon state-sponsored paternalism 
those groups whose articulated demands might have hindered the accumulation (...) and 
hampered the consolidation of the political hegemony of a national bourgeoisie." and 
agrees with Lucena that this is only one side of the coin105. In effect, although the 
"corporatization" of the employers' sector was more flexible, it was still a particularly 
strong reality in some sectors and the all-powerful organisms of economic co-ordination 
ruled over a pyramid that belied the proclaimed model of "association".
The above-mentioned double function seems to have been the main one as there 
were not many of them at the level of the political system. The corporatist institutions 
played a secondary role in the constitutional apparatus and in the sphere of political 
decision-making but their existence was not to be scorned in terms of the effects they 
produced. Schmitter put forward a counter-factual model with the idea of comparing 
Portugal with countries that had had similar "starting points” like Ireland or Greece but 
which had different political systems and his conclusion is that: "its fiscally orthodox and 
economically conservative policies and its strong insistence on the decisional autonomy 
of state institutions, while they inhibited long-run growth and development, did produce 
a distributional outcome which appeared less unequal than that of Greece(...)". On all 
other points the comparison is negative for the "New State"106.
1(̂  Cf. Manuel de Lucena, Op. Cit., p. 221.
105 Cf. Philippe C. Schmitter, "Corporatism...", p. 19.




























































































Schmitter's assumptions on the general functions of the Portuguese corporatist 
system were not unsimilar to those generally attributed to the single parties of 
authoritarian regimes: "preem ptive, i. e. seeks to set out from above structures of 
associability and channels of interest representation in anticipation (...); preventive, i. e. 
attempts not to mobilize (...) but to (...) occupy a certain physical, temporal or ideational 
"space", foreclosing, if not prohibiting, alternative uses of that same space; Defensive, 
i.e. encourages associations to act in the protection of corporatist "rights", privileges or 
exemptions granted from above, rather than in the "aggressive" promotions of new 
projects or interests; Compartmental, i. e. manages to confine potential conflicts within 
specialized, non-interacting decisional "orders"(...)". Combining these factors, he 
concludes that "the role and consequences of state corporatism must be assessed, not 
primarily in terms of what it openly and positively accomplishes, but in terms of what it 
surreptitiously and negatively prevents from happening."107.
Wiarda's conclusions are much more complicated and controversial. His work 
constitutes a good description of the evolution of the corporatist system up to 1974 but, 
as his conclusions are foreseen right from the start, he attaches the "future" of Portugal 
(from 1974 onwards) to the corporatist syndrome mentioned in his introduction108.
2.2.3. The Catholic Church and the "New State"
In 1973 the Revue Française de Sciences Politiques published a special issue on 
the role of religious institutions in the authoritarian regimes, edited by Guy Hermet and 
which included an article on Portugal109. Also in 1973 other research was conducted into 
the subject of relations between the Church and the state from the beginning of the 
century up to the thirties110.
Both works were more than mere statements of the extreme unity, if not 
symbiosis, between the "religious question" and the overthrow of the liberal regime and, 
above all, of the ideological and political mould of the dictator. Richard Robinson 
stressed the importance of organizations like the C.A.D.C. and the Centro Catôlico 
(Catholic Centre) as a mould for the "New State", forming a young group of intellectuals 
and politicians to oppose the growing influence of Integralismo Lusitano (Portuguese 
Integralism) which was the most important of the anti-liberal ideological groups on the
ib id em , p. 58.
108 ytfe  his recent works about the Portuguese transition to democracy.
109 Cf. Silas Cerqueira, "L'Église catholique et la dictature corporatiste portugaise", Revue Française de 
Sciences Politiques, vol. XXIII, n“ 3, Juin 1973, pp. 473/513.
110 Namely the ones of Richard Robinson, cf. o seu artigo:” The Religious Question and the Catholic 
Revival in Portugal, 1900-30”, Journal o f Contemporary History, 12 (1977), pp. 345/362 and Thomas 
C. Bruneau, "Church and State in Portugal: Crises of Cross and Sword", Journal o f Church and State, 




























































































eve of the fall of the parliamentary republic but did not go as far as the period when the 
regime was being formed111. Silas Cerqueira's contribution concentrated on the role of 
the Church throughout the period of Salazarism.
The role of the Church in the regime had many facets. It was not just a question 
of public political support whenever it was requested or the willing efforts to lend most of 
her rites and symbols. Cerqueira mentioned the Church's blessing of the anti-communist 
and anti-liberal crusade in the thirties, its support of the regime's Fascisant institutions 
like Mocidade Portuguesa (Portuguese Youth, MP) and the Legido Portuguesa 
(Portuguese Legion, LP), its participation in the "electoral" campaigns after the Second 
World War, its defence of the colonial war in the sixties. The Church also provided a 
model of mobilization, synchronizing the "renewal of religious practice", of popular 
"piétisme" with the new political power's role of saviour, a point which is sometimes 
underestimated. The religious cult of Fatima and the "parapolitical" functions it fulfilled 
are the most obvious example112.
The Portuguese Catholic Church not only contributed to the ideological mould of 
the regime but was also "one of its essential instruments always under its political 
direction"113. In effect, the postponed concordat (planned in 1933 but only made in 
1940) maintained some of the basic principles of the separation of Church and State. It 
maintained divorce for civil marriages and established relative control of the State over the 
religious institution. As Hermfnio Martins pointed out "while in Spain the 1950 
Concordat granted the Church virtually everything it could ask for, the 1940 Concordat 
did not turn Portugal into a confessional state nor did the Church receive considerable 
educational or financial privileges.”114.
Silas Cerqueira mentioned some elements of a common ideological nucleus of 
Church and State from corporatism to anti-liberalism and anti-communism, spread by the 
Church under the guidance of the regime. He wrote "Some of these ideological themes 
can be found in all conservative ideologies in a normal period (...)" but here they were 
exaggerated and "formed a whole, a system.”115. The legitimizing functions were 
numerous not only at a central political level - after each crisis, above all after 1945, there 
was a corresponding declaration of support which only began to be more discreet in the 
final phase of the regime - but also mainly in the "provinces" of the mral areas and small 
towns where a whole "logistic" apparatus provided a considerable "political 
socialization".
1H Richard Robinson, ” The Religious Question...", p. 358.
112 Cf. Silas Cerqueira, "L'Église Catholique...”, pp. 481/490.
H 1 Idem, p. 504.
H 4 Herminio Martins, "Opposition in Portugal", Government and Opposition, Vol. 4, N°2, Spring 
1969, p. 262.



























































































2.2.4 Elections "pas comme les autres"
In 1968 in an article on the opposition to the "New State”, Henru'nio Martins 
mentioned the regime's high degree of political rationality in the field of the 
administration of violence, choosing an "optimum of terror rather than a crude maximum 
(...)"116. The same could be said with regard to the institutional apparatus of the political 
system, a formal compromise between liberal and cotporatist principle of representation. 
As we have already said, the electoral principle was maintained and followed religiously, 
within the established time limits.
The appearance of an "electoral opposition" to the regime after 1945 did not go 
unnoticed by researchers. Faced with the question :"why did that manifestly anti-liberal, 
anti-democratic regimes, bother to hold even a simulacra of elections at all?", Schmitter 
quite correctly detects some answers which are not valid in Portugal's case. Unlike the 
socialist regimes of the time, the 99% rule never existed in Portugal. Neither did "Salazar 
seek to use the electoral process as a mass-mobilation device", nor did the masses fulfil 
the role of internal legitimation that they did in other more "plebiscitary" authoritarian 
regimes117.
Although we have mentioned it before, we must emphasize that up to 1945 not 
even a dummy "opposition” was allowed during the elections, the function of which was 
to legitimize the formation of the regime, after which the subject was dropped until it 
began to look as if the Allies would win the Second World War. Of all the reasons for 
holding elections in the authoritarian regimes discussed in Schmitter's work, the most 
prosaic was, in our opinion, the only important one: "to legitimate it in the eyes of 
foreigners” and was therefore of an external nature118. All the other reasons were of 
secondary importance.
2.2.5 Schools and Ideology in a "Conservative Regime"
In her introduction to a thesis on Salazar's school system in the thirties which 
she researched mainly before 1974, Maria Filomena Monica discussed some of the 
bibliography quoted here. She noted the great discrepancies between this bibliography on 
the central cases and the analysis of Salazar's regime and concluded that "hardly anything 
that has been written on Fascism applies to Portugal's case"119. Regarding the
1 Cf. Herminio Martins, "Opposition...", p. 263.
117 Cf. Philippe C. Schmitter," The Impact and Meaning...”, p. 146.
118 Idem, p. 150.
119 Cf. Maria Filomena Mónica, Educaçâo e Sociedade no Portugal de Salazar (A escola primària 




























































































comparison with Italian Fascism, she supported the position whereby "the differences 
between Salazarism and Italian Fascism are greater than the similarities (...)" and, 
inspired by Barrington Moore, characterized the regime as an "inferior form of a 
particularly pacific and dilatory conservative modernization through a revolution from 
above"120.
In the conclusion to her work, she stressed the central role of the Catholic 
religion in the socialization of schools in the "New State", whose central values were 
obedience, resignation, charity and patriotism, legitimizing a social order considered an 
"immutable structure"121. Given the non-totalitarian character of the regime, leaving 
"many areas of private life virtually free from political indoctrination", the "natural” 
hierarchy was enough, in most cases, to ensure order. The "Church still fulfilled its old 
role of ideological machine par excellence" and she even advances the idea that, in the 
Portugal of the thirties, it was "more important than school itself'122.
120 Idem, p. 94 and 105.
121 Idem, p. 345.
122 Idem, p. 355/56. On the impact of the regime in rural society, Cf. José Cutileiro, A Portuguese 
Rural Society, (Oxford: 1971) and Joyce Firstenberg Riegelhaupt, "Peasants and Politics in Salazar's 
Portugal: The Corporate State and Village ''Nonpolitics'' in, Lawrence Graham and Harry M. Makler 




























































































3- INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH IN THE EIGHTIES
In general, the research was fairly divided and evolved along the lines mentioned 
above with hardly any variations with regard to the "New State"123. It tended towards a 
considerable diversity of methods and empirical investigation much less concerned with 
finding and testing global models reflecting the evolution of the various schools involved. 
On the other hand, with the natural exception of the Iberian peninsula owing to the 
survival of both regimes into the seventies, Fascism was gradually abandoned as a 
subject of research by sociologists and political scientists and left to history and by 
history we mean both the subject and that which is past.
General and comparative works became fewer. There was literally an explosion 
of partial research which reflected (more, now, in History) the methodological and sub- 
disciplinary evolution. The word explosion can be used here without the risk of 
exaggeration since hundreds of works appeared on the most diverse aspects of Fascism, 
making full use of the arsenal of methods available from ideological to social, political, 
local, economic, oral, biographical history.
As Geoff Eley said, the accumulation of more recent research "has seemed to 
compromise the explanatory potential of the old theorizations”124. The truth is, however, 
that the old theories are still the main points of reference, whether we wish to contest or 
confirm them, and no new ones emerge from this undeniable, empirical advance. The 
most fruitful result was perhaps the opportunity to classify more strictly the movements 
and regimes from a comparative perspective, which is quite clear from the various 
"descriptive and classificative" proposals which have appeared in the meantime. The 
aspects of definition mentioned by Eley as being the most complex, like those referring to 
the classes, the economy, political change and emergency conditions were mostly lost in 
national singularities125.
It is worth introducing here a synthesis of what was said about Portugal in this 
research, particularly by national historiographies whose regimes were more susceptible 
to mentioning the "New State” and Portuguese Fascism as a comparison126.
123 For a analysis of this recent bibliography see, Antcinio Costa Pinto, ” O Salazarismo na Recente 
Investiga^ao Intemacional sobre o Fascismo Europeu- Velhos problemas, velhas respostas ?", Analise 
Social, Vol. XXV (108-109), 1990, pp. 695/713.
124 Geoff Eley, ” What Produces Fascism: Preindustrial Traditions or a Crises of the Capitalist State?” 
in Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann (Edit, by), Op. Cit, p. 69/70.
125 p_ 70.
*26 Even though the investigation has become well enough internationalized, the classification by 
country and/or geographic area can be justified by the fact that it is for the most part the work of 
historians. And given that history is the social sciences discipline most dominated by the "national 
factor" that continues to be the determinant model for most investigation as well as for the very 




























































































3.1 ITALIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY ON FASCISM
It is not worth even an attempt at an examination of the historiography on Italian 
Fascism, so extensive has Italian production been on this central theme of its recent 
history127.
The rich Italian historiographical production, little of it in agreement, showed 
some controversial rifts which were to become famous. After excluding the distances (as 
I do not feel that they are comparable) it had already had its Historikerstreit, caused by De 
Felice's famous interview on Fascism in 1975128. For our purposes here, it is worth 
mentioning that they have centred on the peculiarity of the Italian phenomenon. The 
comparison, when it arises, and it has obviously been a decisive topic, is with Nazism 
and it was around this comparison that the controversy was centred up to the eighties129.
The comparative history of the two regimes was hardly cultivated at all by the 
Italians and was rarely chosen as a subject. References to Portugal were few as the 
discussion centred more on the subjects mentioned above. In the seventies some studies 
of Portugal were written but usually separately from Italian historiography on 
Fascism130. Portugal's transition to democracy and its peculiarities aroused some interest 
among the Marxists in 1975. Some contributions were made in the eighties, however, for 
instance by Enzo Collotti amongst others who defended a "generic Fascism"131.
It was in reflection of this particular point of view that some studies including 
Portugal rejected Portugal's "exclusion" on the basis of the fact that "Fascism - as 
occurred in other central and eastern European countries - (...)" was achieved by a
the great number of "national" works and the complexity of the directions followed by the respective 
historiographies, we adopted as criteria the following: to give the briefest of introductions to the 
situation as to investigation of the theme in those cases for which we have up-to-date information, from 
the diverse interpretations of the national case to those references having to do with Portugal. The 
German historiography has been excluded.
127 As an introduction to the research of the last twenty years vide, Emilio Gentile, "Fascism in Italian 
Historiography: In Search of an Individual Historical Identity", Journal o f Contemporary History, Voi. 21 
(1986), pp. 179/208.
128 Renzo De Felice, Intrevista sul fascismo, a cura di M. A. Ledeen, (Bari: 1975). For a bilan of his 
monumental biography of Mussolini vide Passato e Presente, n° 1, Gennaio-Giugno 1982, pp. 5/30.
129 As recently as 1988 and in the midst of the German Historikerstreit, certain of De Felice's interviews 
on "anti-fascism" and Italian democracy provoked strong reactions. Jader Jacobelli’s short collective 
synthesis ( a cura di), Il fascismo e gli storici oggi, (Bari: 1988) constitutes the most recent update in 
the historiographical perspective on the theme.
130 Cf. A. Albonico, Breve Storia del Portogallo Contemporaneo, (Napoli: 1977) and P. Giannotti and 
S. Pivato, Il Portogallo dalla Prima alla Seconda Republica (1910-1975), (Urbino: 1978).
131 Even though always marking the peculiarities in Portugal's case. For an example check Gustavo 
Comi's recent pedagogic synthesis, Fascismo e Fascismi. Movimenti, Partiti e Regimi in Europa e nel 




























































































different route and emphasized the parallelism of the "precise and functional reaction of a 
particular bourgeois group to the crisis of the liberal state and the powerful advance of the 
popular classes."132. Santarelli, who wrote the above statement, considers Salazarism the 
"extreme Right, nonradical but traditionalist wing of European Fascism.”133.
Enzo Collotti recognized immediately that "Salazar's Portugal is perhaps the 
situation which caused analysts the greatest difficulties in fitting it into the Fascist 
phenom enon"134. These difficulties "in making an unequivocal definition of the 
Portuguese regime arise from the complexity of the ideological and institutional 
components and, moreover, its social characteristics"135. Collotti is familiar with the 
position of other historians on the Salazar regime and disagrees with those who denied its 
Fascist character based on the formal nature of its political institutions, although he 
recognizes that "the more specifically Fascist elements of the Portuguese Right were not 
able to confirm its physiognomy in the material constitution of the "New State"136.
For this author, in summary, "differently from the Italian Fascist regime but in 
analogy with the Austrian experience, the constitution of the regime in Portugal lacked 
any real process of mobilization of the masses and any pseudo-revolutionarism: the 
regime was voluntarily conservative, the basis for recruiting its leading élite was 
restricted and is notable for the emphasis on the technocratic element with university 
degrees. From this point of view, there was an attempt at creating a leading oligarchy, 
there was a consensus among the middle classes with no ambition to bring about any 
social transformation in Portugal."137. Where, then, are the aspects which make Collotti 
consider that Portugal was not a marginal phenomenon but presented "the epigonal 
characteristics of Fascism"? He discovered several: the "totalitarian” elimination of 
political adversaries; corporatism which was instrumental in the elimination of the 
autonomy of the workers' movement; the "moralizing" lack of spiritual or economic 
progress. On the other hand, an important fact is that when the "conservative 
stabilization" failed, all internal repressive virulence was channeled into a long war which 
eventually fragmented the unity of the armed forces138.
Renzo de Felice defends a different position. Although he had never actually 
studied Portugal’s case in depth, he had no doubt that regimes like Salazar's "should not
132 Cf. Nuccio Cocco, "Salazarismo" in Nicola Tranfaglia et Alti ( a cura di), Storia D'Europa, Voi. 3, 
(Firenze: 1980), p. 1039.
133 E. Santarelli, "Il caso porthogese: radici e premesse di una rivoluzione", Critica Marxista, n°4,1975, 
pp. 41/59, quoted by N. Cocco, Idem, p. 1038.
134 Enzo Collotti, Fascismo, Fascismi, (Firenze: 1989), p. 117.
135 Idem, p. 118
1311 Idem, p. 119.
137 Idem, p. 121.




























































































be listed as Fascist, but considered classic, conservative, authoritarian regimes". Thus, 
once again, his main criterion is the different relationship with the masses139.
3.2 HISTORIOGRAPHY ON FRANCOISM
For obvious reasons, recent research on Francoism did not follow a very 
different course from that on Portugal. Although the historiography on the contemporary 
era developed earlier, most of this surge was produced by sociologists or political 
scientists. There was also international research which made a decisive contribution to the 
first scientific studies140.
The theoretical influences of Spanish historians were not unlike the Portuguese 
ones. Juan Linz's prolific works based on Francoism to create his "authoritarian ideal- 
type" left a considerable mark on the first efforts and were later used in a large number of 
partial studies. Neither did the criticism differ significantly, especially from those who 
preferred to use the adjective "Fascist"141. Those of most interest, however, were those 
which experimented alternative models of characterization, including the "New State”, as 
put forward by the sociologist Salvador Giner.
According to Giner, Francoism and other Southern European regimes, 
especially Portugal, can be defined as a variation on modem despotism which he calls 
"reactionary despotism". Giner's ideal type is different from Linz's more in appearance 
than in essence and adds an element which is not to be ignored: a class 
characterization142. The "reactionary coalition" on which these regimes are based is 
different from the "middle class" model owing to the intervention of the agrarian, 
industrial and financial oligarchy. This "coalition" which accompanies the growth of the 
new regimes gives rise to its divergence, in the organization of the political system, from 
the totalitarian regimes due to its syncretic nature. On the other hand, Giner tested the 
inclusion of these regimes in the "longevity" of regimes of Southern Europe143.
139 Renzo De Felice, "Il Fenomeno Fascista", Storia contemporanea, anno X, n“ 4/5, Ottobre 1979, p. 
624.
140 por a debate of this research vide, Stanley G. Payne, "O Fascismo Espanhol Revisitado”, Ler 
História, 8 (1986), pp. 115/120
141 Vide the critique of Juan Martinez Alier,"Notas sobre el Franquismo", Papers: Revista de Sociologia, 
8 (1978), pp. 27/51.
142 Cf. the model and its performence in the case of francoism in Salvado Giner, Eduardo Sevilla- 
Guzmân and Manuel Pérez Yruela, " Despotismo Moderno Y Dominación de Classe. Para urna sociologia 
del régimen franquista”, Papers: Revista de Sociologia, 8 (1978), pp. 103/141.
143 vide Salvador Giner,"Political Economy, Legitimation, and the State in Southern Europe” in 
Philippe C. Schmitter Et Alii (Edited By), Transitions From Authoritarian Rule. Southern Europe 




























































































The second problem to which the only comparison possible would be Portugal 
is the time factor. Manuel Ramirez denied the possibility of using a single concept for a 
regime that lasted as long as Franco's. He put forward three different concepts for the 
three stages of the dictatorship. He defined the first, which is the one of most interest to 
us, as totalitarian and considered it a form of Fascism144.
Almost all the empirical works refer to the central cases of the Fascist example, 
Germany and, basically, Italy. Only Javier Tusell in a recent comparative work 
mentioned the "New State". In this work, all this bibliography was discussed. In short, 
as Tusell dedicates a whole chapter to the comparison between Salazarism and 
Francoism, the Portuguese regime is at one end of the spectrum and Francoism is in the 
middle, "between the maximum of totalitarianism represented by Mussolini's regime and 
Salazar’s minimum"145. Tusell is aware of the different periods involved and, to him, the 
regimes are very similar after 1945 when Franco's regime approaches Catholic 
corporatism and the Falangist components take second place. Before then, while 
Francoism drew closer to Fascism, Portugal remained closer to the authoritarian ideal. 
For Tusell, the different periods were much more obvious in Spain than in Portugal. 
Their longevity, however, make them members of the same political family, that of "non- 
totalitarian conservative dictatorships"146.
3.4 FRENCH HISTORIOGRAPHY, VICHY AND SALAZAR
The ideological affinities were never closer in any other regimes than between 
Salazarism and Vichy. No other looked as much to the Portuguese "New State" as the 
Vichy regime. The subject of the radical right and French Fascism which is centred in the 
Vichy regime, has been the target of intensive and sometimes quite polemic research, 
some of which from abroad: mainly from North America and Israel, and has confronted 
various historiographical traditions147. More than in the case of Italy, any discussion on 
this subject would have to take these international works into consideration as they were
144 M. Ramirez defined three phases: Totalitarian (1939-45); empirico-conservative (1945-60) ; "tecno- 
pragmatic (1960-75).Tide Manuel Ramirez, Espana.1939-1975. Régimen Politico e Ideologia 
(Barcelona: 1978), pp. 23/35.
145 Cf. Javier Tusell, Op. Cit., p. 270. Cf. from the same author, "El Franquismo corno Dictadura", in 
Hipólito de la Torre (Coord.), Portugal y Espana en el Cambio Politico (1958-1978), (Mènda: 1989), pp. 
47/58.
146 Idem, pp. 272/304.
147 The most important was provoked by the works of Zeev Stentiteli, Vide António Costa Pinto, " 





























































































not mere interpretative syntheses but have contributed considerable empirical research, 
some of which constituted important milestones up to the eighties148. One of these 
milestones was, without doubt, establishing that Fascism in France was not merely an 
imported phenomenon as most of the French studies tended to consider it.
In general, French historians, from Rémond in the fifties up to the present day, 
used a fairly restricted concept of Fascism. This is understandable since most of their 
research concentrated on political and ideological movements which had coexisted in 
France since the turn of the century or on the "Fascist intellectual", a term we prefer to 
"intellectual Fascism". We should add that the individual progress of some well-known 
political figures, from the Left wing and socialism to the most radical Fascism, which 
was less usual in other countries, made necessary greater conceptual clarity when dealing 
with the subject149.
More than in any other country, typologies of authoritarian political movements 
were used (either bipartite or tripartite) and an attempt was made to isolate Fascism from 
the radical Right-wing movements along the same lines as some Anglo-Saxon tendencies. 
Strangely, the positions most inclined not to differentiate them were not defended by 
French but by foreign historians, from Nolte in the sixties to Robert Soucy and others in 
the eighties150.
This point of view would lead to the demarcation of Fascism in the 
characterization of the Vichy regime, which a vast majority consider "authoritarian". 
Almost everyone is in agreement on this point, even international historians from Robert 
O. Paxton to the present day. It is not surprising, therefore, that, for reasons of 
theoretical coherence, the comparison with Portugal has been mentioned (mentioned, that 
is, rather than practised) and it is in this field that Portugal has been quoted abundantly, 
almost always as an example of the "authoritarian" variety.
The list of references to the "New State" could begin with the fifties, but it is 
enough here to refer to Pierre Milza's most recent work. Milza not only draws attention to 
"the basic differences from Fascism" but also gives them the corresponding economic 
and social basis when he says that "the main aim of Salazar's dictatorship was to maintain 
and strengthen the power of the great (agricultural) landowners to the detriment of 
financial and industrial capital". This merely confirms "the frankly reactionary nature of
148 Cf. Eugen Weber, Action Française, (New York: 1961); Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France. Old 
Guard and New Order (New York: 1972). For the most recent research vide, John F. Sweets, "Hold that 
Pendulum! Redefining Fascism, Collaboration and Resistance in France", French Historical Studies, Vol. 
XV, No. 4 (Fall 1988), pp. 731/758.
149 Vide the research of Philippe Burrin, La Dérive Fasciste. Doriot, Déat, Bergery, 1933-1945, (Paris: 
1986), with a different perspective of Zeev Stemhell, Ni Droite ni Gauche. L'idéologie fasciste en France, 
(Paris: 1983).




























































































the regime which tries to hold back rather than stimulate economic progress and whose 
main aim is to restore the traditional values of Portuguese society"151.
The introduction to any comparison may be obvious but should be clarified and 
it was clearly stated by French historians: in spite of the autonomy with which it was 
established as a political regime, Vichy was an "occupation” regime and whether as an 
ideological or political project with a certain social base, it did not come to power 
autonomously. As a project it was to have no opportunity to assert itself in French 
society, which did not correspond to it. In Portugal, on the other hand, the opposite 
seems to be the case and the proof of this was its long life without any significant outside 
pressure. This discrepancy makes any effort at comparison turn much more to the 
ideological field and to the political system which dominated Vichy, than to the historical 
conditions which brought about the fall of liberalism and the founding of the regimes in 
the two countries.
The profound influence of the main movement of the French radical Right in 
Portugal had much to do with the identification felt by many Vichy collaborators in the 
forties. Maurras's Action Française was the main source of inspiration of its Portuguese 
counterpart which was, in tum, the most decisive anti-democratic, ideological movement 
of the time. Although he came from the ranks of the social Catholic movement, the 
Portuguese dictator himself never concealed the influence of Maurras and supported him 
even in the adverse post-war climate, in a rare, if not unique, movement on Salazar's 
part. On the other hand, the example of the "New State" was constantly mentioned by the 
French radical Right in the thirties. This phenomenon was more well-known in Portugal 
than in France and has been relatively well researched. René Rémond used this example 
to distinguish Portugal's regime from Fascism: "It is enough to see in which circles in 
France sympathies were aroused: the Maurrazian and integralist extreme Right."152.
Pierre Milza, repeating a common opinion, said that Vichy's "closest relation 
was the paternalist regime of Dr. Salazar. At least if one considers the aims expressed by 
the two dictatorships: to restore the traditional institutions and élites, to re-establish moral 
order and the spiritual leadership of the church, the rejection of modernism and industrial 
civilization with all its implications of distrust of Fascist totalitarianism which was its 
ideological product together with liberalism and Marxist socialism. The divergence from 
the Portuguese experience, however, was quite clear on two points. On one hand, Vichy 
was an established industrialized country and the regressive route it invited its followers 
to take derived much more from Utopia. On the other, the mling élite of Vichy was much 
less homogeneous than that which ruled the destiny of the "New State" from the 
beginning of the thirties. Right from the start, this established a hiatus between the
151 Cf. Pierre Milza, Les Fascismes, (Paris: 1985), p. 332.




























































































reactionary hard core and the other inspirers of power"153. Non-French specialists like 
Robert O. Paxton shared similar opinions154.
We must also mention what some French political scientists and historians who 
wrote about the Portuguese regime concluded about Salazar’s regime. Jacques Georgel, 
in his conclusion, wondered "Was Salazarism Fascism? The question has been debated. 
The above pages, to my mind, justify the answer 'no' (...). If by "Fascism" we mean an 
ordinary dictatorship, then Salazarism was in fact Fascism; but from the scientific point 
of view, this assimilation is of no interest at all. If one wishes to take the term "Fascism" 
as a precise definition, one must go further"155.
3.3 AUSTRIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE EASTERN EUROPEAN 
DICTATORSHIPS
Dolfuss's dictatorship has always been mentioned both in Portugal and by 
international research, as being comparable to Salazar's. Some elements are automatically 
recognizable: the importance of Catholicism and corporatism, or the construction of the 
regime from above. Austrian researchers, however, do not seem to have made the same 
comparison and it is only mentioned by some international researchers, particularly those 
who considered "clerical Fascism" an operative category.
Austria is a privileged field for the analysis of Fascism and is unique in that it 
underwent both variations one after the other. The authoritarianism versus totalitarianism 
debate does not seem to be a mere academic question here or, at least, was certainly not 
for those who lived under both of them. Even though Austrian Nazism has sometimes 
been considered a foreign phenomenon under "occupation", which is an argument used 
more for reasons of political or international convenience than anything else, the internal 
character of both experiences is taken as fact by modem Austrian historiography and the 
comparison is therefore legitimate.
For our purposes, the central point is the Dolfuss-Shuschnigg regime (1933-38) 
defined by its opponents at the time as "Austro-Fascism". The discussion of its 
characterization uses the same theoretical references as those in the Iberian peninsula.
153 Cf. Pierre Milza, Le Fascisme Français. Passé et Présent. (Paris: 1987), p. 230.
154 Cf. his chapter "A França de Vichy sob urna Perspectiva Comparativa", in AAVV, O Estado Novo. 
Dos Origens ao Firn da Autarcia, Vol. I, (Lisboa: 1987), pp. 49/58.
155 Cf. Jacques Georgel, Le Salazarisme. Histoire et Bilan, 1926-1974, (Paris: 1981), p. 301. Vide the 
more recent, Jacques Marcadé, Le Portugal au XX Siècle, 1910-1985, (Paris: 1988). The object of this 
study does not include comment on the above-mentioned works on Portugal, however it should be noted 




























































































While for some the definition makes sense, for others like Gerhard Botz, Dolfuss's 
dictatorship "did not have the essential traits of a true Fascist regime; neither was it only a 
corporatist state in the sense of Catholic social doctrine. Observed at its height in 1934, it 
was not much more than a traditional dictatorship, established from above, an 
authoritarian state with a Fascist coating and a corporatist patina. From the point of view 
of the classification of political regimes, the basis for the definition "Austro-Fascism" 
seems rather dubious.''156.
For both historical and theoretical reasons, most of the comparisons were made 
basically with Italy owing to the political and financial efforts of Italian Fascism in 
Austria which took the form of support of Austrian Fascist movements and the 
establishing of the Dolfuss regime itself in strategic rivalry to Nazi Germany. On the 
other hand, as Austria was not a highly industrialized country and had an important 
agricultural sector, the Austrian economy, Austrian society and the cultural importance of 
Catholicism were factors which made Austria's and Italy's cases more similar157.
For the purpose of comparison, several factors could bring Dolfuss's and 
Salazar's regimes closer but some difficulties do arise. Some are of a historical nature and 
arise from different conditions in the sphere of the construction of the "National State" 
and of external interference in the overthrow of liberalism. There are other, internal 
difficulties like the different way in which the two regimes were formed and broke with 
democracy. The similarities woth studying would be more on the level of the formal 
apparatus of the political system, of its ideological legitimation and the central importance 
of the Catholic church in both dictatorships.
The importance of the Catholic church was decisive, both in the overthrow of 
democracy and in both their ideologies, particularly their corporatist character. The two 
dictatorships were built from above, had single parties with similar vocations and origins, 
and the same distrust of their internal Fascist movements, particularly in Austria with its 
greater social and political importance. This "from above" must be qualified since, while 
in Portugal there was a clean break with the liberal order, in Austria it was one of the 
"lager” with party representation while still under a democratic regime, "Fascizing" it 
from above. These and other aspects have not yet been the subject of a comparative
15® Cf. Gerhard Botz," Fascismo e Autoritarismo in Austria. Heimwehr, nazionalsocialismo e 
"austrofascismo”, in Roberto Cazzola and Gian Enrico Rusconi (A cura di), II "Caso Austria". 
DalVAnschluss" all'èra Waldheim, (Torino: 1988), p. 48. Vide também Gerhard Botz, Krisenzonen einer 
Demokratie. Gewall, Streit und Konfliktunterdriickung in Osterreich seit 1918, (Frankfurt: 1987), pp. 
211/236. As an introduction lo the several interpretations vide, John Rath and Carolyn W. Schum, "The 
Dolfuss-Schuschnigg Regime: Fascist or Authoritarian ?", in Stein U. Larsen et alii (Edited By), Who 
Were the Fascists. Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen: 1980), pp. 249/256.




























































































study, but in the dominant classifications in the eighties, Austria was always placed near 
Salazar's regime, almost in the same "family".
The Eastern European dictatorships, in terms of analysis and characterization, 
present similar problems (possibly more serious) to those faced in the cases of Portugal 
and Austria. There would be no point in risking a historiographical summary but a part of 
the bibliography quoted on the dictatorships in the period between the two World Wars 
was based, sometimes in excess, on the academic work of western historians or of 
exiles. A whole series of pioneer works was written by Anglo-Saxon and Western 
European social scientists158.
The idea of a great political block against research into the subject or the 
ideological factors of its study is not an exaggeration up till the recent breakdown of the 
barriers, but at the end of the sixties, empirical and comparative research began to emerge 
with a variety of interpretations and great national inequalities, part of which was not 
always included in international debate159. Most of the authors who left their mark on 
interpretative discussion in the West were discussed and included, the duo 
authoritarianism-Fascism was accepted by many of them, the concept of totalitarianism 
was used, the limitations of some Marxist models were restated i. e. regarding the 
relationship between the social, economic structure and authoritarian systems established. 
When we read works on Fascism written in the seventies and eighties by historians from 
Eastern Europe, we find the same problems and conceptual doubts as those we have 
already come across160 *.
For the moment, we will put aside the debate on the legitimacy of grouping 
together in one block all the extremely different political and economic national situations 
but it is a fact that most of the dictatorships of this part of Europe from the small Baltic 
countries to the countries in the South, had very similar characteristics. On the other 
hand, their inclusion in a classification of European Fascism does not seem to be a 
controversial point. Whatever our position on the use of the concept, they will always be 
closer to their counterparts at the other end of Europe and to Austria than to Nazism and 
Italy. If we exclude the short period of domination by the Iron Guard in Romania (albeit 
shared), none of the other movements came to power.
The Fascism-authoritarianism problem arose here to be clarified owing to the 
undeniable reality of a sometimes very strong presence of national Fascist movements
15^ Apart many monographies vide some works as the already quoted of Peter Sugar or Anthony 
Polonsky, The Little Dictators. The History of Eastern Europe since 1918, (London and Boston: 1975).
159 Vide Fasismus a Europa. Fascism and Europe, 2 vol., (Prague: 1969-1970). For a example of this 
effort from Polish historiography vide, Janusz Zamowski (Editor), Dictatorships in East-Central Europe. 
1918-1939, Polish Historical Library n“ 4, (Wroclaw: 1983).
160 Cf Janus Zarnowski, "Authoritarian Systems in Central and South-Eastern Europe (1918-1939).
Analogies and Differences” and Franciszek Ryska, "European Fascism. Divergences and Similarities. 




























































































which attained much more political weight than their Iberian counterparts and also owing 
to their repression (to a greater or lesser extent) by the growing authoritarian power itself 
which, at least in Portugal, also happened. The combination of the Fascist regimes and 
movements was also disturbed by outside influences161.
In spite of each country's peculiarities, some common traits united most of the 
regimes. All of them were established on the underdeveloped periphery of industrialized 
Europe and the majority of the population still worked in agriculture. All of them 
followed attempts at establishing democracies (very closely in most cases). All of them 
were based on the traditional élites and were to a great extent a response by these 
traditional élites. As Zamowski says, they "were a new form of power of the old ruling 
classes and circles, and were not governments by a new Fascist "élite" of the type 
produced by mass Fascist organizations in Italy and Germany.”162. The means they used 
to overthrow the liberal regimes was the classic one: military coup. Given the existence at 
the same time of national Fascist movements, research tended to draw attention to the 
differences between the social bases of the regimes and the bases of these movements163.
There was a wide variety of forms of government: from more institutionalized 
dictatorships, like those of the Baltic countries, to others with limited pluralism like 
Hungary or Poland up to 1935. Smetona's Lithuania, for example, was much closer to 
its western counterparts, like the "New State", than Pilsudski's regime in Poland which 
did not totally eliminate the opposition. An element they all had in common was the 
creation from above of parties supporting the regime, which were similar to their 
equivalents in Austria and the Iberian peninsula in their nature, basis and functions.
For the purpose of comparison, some specific elements of this part of Europe 
should be considered. One of them is the "national question” which took a completely 
different form here, and all the problems arising from it, the national minorities, the re­
establishment of the "National State" etc.. Another is outside influences arising from the 
power struggle after the Treaty of Versailles.
In discussing the nature of these regimes, the national historiographies produced 
the same kind of questions as we have already mentioned and it is therefore not worth 
repeating them here. In his conclusion to a collective work, Franciszek Ryska suggested 
a return to origins and said that that the initial basic presupposition that should guide 
research was that "there is no Fascism without Fascists"164. References to the "New 
State” were rare and no systematic comparative work on these regimes and those of the
1611 About the relations between the two fascist regimes and the movements and regimes of Eastern 
Europe vide, Jerzy W. Borejsza, Il Fascismo e L'Europa Orientale. Dalla propaganda all'aggressione, 
(Roma-Bari: 1981).
1(12 Janus Zamowski, " Authoritarian Systems...", p. 11.
163 w e exclude the changes provoked by German occupation or by its inspiration, from the thirties on.




























































































Iberian peninsula has yet been done, although they are always quoted as being the most 
similar.
3.6 SYNTHESES AND GENERAL INTERPRETATIONS
In reflection of the bibliography discussed above, most of the syntheses 
produced in the eighties substantiated the demarcation of the Portuguese regime.
To quote two examples from different historiographical backgrounds: Stephen J. 
Lee in The European Dictatorships placed the "New State” among the types of 
dictatorships "fundamentally non Fascists"165; as far as French historiography is 
concerned, it is enough to consult Les Fascismes by Pierre Milza who repeats the same 
opinion though in more detail166. Stuart Woolf, in a synthesis in 1986 restated the 
similarities and differences between the Iberian regimes and the German and Italian 
regimes, which were also applicable to the Eastern European cases, and concluded that 
"finally the main distinguishing characteristic between the authoritarian and Fascist 
regimes in Europe between the two World Wars was the relative absence in the former of 
plans for aggressive expansion and also their realistic hostility to the danger represented 
by the Fascist movements they found at home"167. In a recent comparative essay, Juan 
Linz considered four types of situation from the point of view of the overthrow of the 
liberal regimes and was adamant in confirming the absence of a Fascist component in the 
process. However, in his chapter comparing Salazarism and Francoism, he puts forward 
the supposition that the former was closer to the Italian "ideal type". In effect, "we could 
argue that the regime created by Salazar was more coherent ideologically, 
organizationally, continuous in its élite recruitment and over time than the Franco regime 
with its more easily distinguishable phases and twists in policy"168.
This brief assessment of the most recent historical work leads us to conclude 
that, although we note a progressive empirical knowledge of the the "New State", it was 
the dominant paradigms that still marked the separation of Salazar's regime from 
European Fascism. On the other hand, the predominance of monographs and the 
excessive use of an almost exclusively Portuguese basis for analysis resulted in the
16,5 cf. Stephen J. Lee, The European Dictatorships. 1918-1945, (London: 1988), pp. 107/134.
!66 Cf. Pierre Milza, Op. Cit., p. 332.
167 Cf. Stuart Woolf, "Movimenti e regimi di tipo fascista in Europa", in Nicola Tranfaglia and 
Massimo Firpo (a cura di), La Storia. I grandi problemi dal Medioevo all'Età Contemporanea, Voi. 9, 
(Torino: 1986), p. 325.
168 Cf. Juan Linz, Fascism, Breakdown o f Democracy, Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes: 




























































































relegation of the comparative dimension to the field of common sense, in many cases 




























































































4- RECENT PORTUGUESE RESEARCH
The transition to democracy in Portugal began the slow institutionalization of the 
studies of the 20th century and particularly on the "New State". The natural euphoria in 
the form of denouncement was followed by the first studies from the social sciences. 
Many of the works discussed above were then translated and used as a basis for this new 
field of research. The two conferences on the subject held in the eighties summed up this 
research and on consulting it, it is easy to see the progressive enlargement, both in 
quantity and in quality of the research community169.
Although research into Salazar's regime was progressively less politically 
oriented, it naturally reflected the ideological rifts, especially among the different 
opposition families. Some of them were related to the extreme left's objections to the 
dominant interpretation by the communist party of the role of the regime with regard to 
the development of capitalism in Portugal, or to the liberal opposition's views on the 
equally obstructive role of the "New State". This dimension, which springs directly from 
the internal problems of national cultural élites, which were in fact quickly toned down, 
will not be given due attention in this chapter in deference to the dimension which 
reflected upon relations between the "New State" and Fascism.
4.1 GOING BACK TO THE ORIGINS
The subject of the origins of the "New State" and of Fascism became embroiled, 
in the case of Portugal, with that of the more general crisis of clientelistic liberalism. 
Following the classic lines of recent international research especially regarding the history 
of the "surrender" of liberal culture and the popularity with the intellectual élites of the 
anti-democratic alternatives, two themes tended to be confused: that of the political and 
ideological origins of the authoritarian regime and of its leader with that of the political 
and ideological agents of the overthrow of liberalism in 1926.
It happens that these two moments of transition to authoritarianism were, in 
Portugal's case, quite distinct and the most important agents in the fall of liberalism later 
played a secondary role in the modelling of the "New State". The non-existence of a
Cf. AA. VV. 0  Fascismo em Portugal, (Lisboa: 1982) and AA.VV, 0  Estado Novo - Das origens 




























































































Fascist party which in some way dominated the transition process contributed to this lack 
of definition.
It was precisely in search of the reasons for this "absence" that some initial 
efforts were made. For Manuel Villaverde Cabral, following Lucena's example, if the 
form of the State and its structures and not the "choreographic" aspects are given more 
emphasis, the Portuguese regime was one of the "most perfect varieties (...) of Fascism”. 
Cabral gives more priority to the subject of the ideological and political origins of 
Portuguese authoritarianism than to the regime itself in his studies and always included 
the authoritarian alternative in the course of "dependent capitalism" and of the crisis of the 
liberal state since the turn of the century170.
According to Cabral, the first question that should be asked (and to which his 
answer is "yes") is "did Portuguese authoritarianism arise exclusively from the 
peculiarities of Portuguese society and its political system or was it part of a larger 
international trend?". For Cabral, although Portugal had not known "a straightforward 
Fascist mass movement, it did experience, throughout most of the first quarter of the 20th 
century, a protracted period of social and political mass conflict, during which the 
Portuguese liberal system was put under extremely severe pressures (...)". In his 
opinion, "These increasingly anti-liberal, anti-democratic and anti-socialist organized 
pressures, although not unified by a single mass movement, were, so to speak, 
functional equivalents of a Fascist movement in so far as they performed all the roles 
normally assigned to Fascist parties."171. The reasons for the absence of a Fascist party, 
basically "from the reaction of the petit bourgeoisie to the failure of the parliamentary 
state(...)”, were above all "the contamination from the start of the right wing dictatorial 
reaction by the monarchic element, on one hand and above all by the Catholic element on 
the other, either jointly or separately"172.
Several researchers in the eighties chose the subject of the crisis of the 
republican regime using myriad different methods, from Stemhell's intellectual argument 
against the liberal order to the models of the sociology of modernization, particularly that 
of Organski, on Fascism as a "compromise" of the dominant classes in the transition to 
an industrial society. If the former was disseminated in innumerable works, which we
170 Cf. Manuel Villaverde Cabral, Portugal na Alvorada do Século XX, Forças sociais, poder politico e 
desenvolvimenlo econòmico, (Lisboa: 1979); "a Grande Guerra e o Sidonismo. Esboço interpretativo", 
Anâlise Social, Vol. XV(58), 1979, pp. 327/392; "the Seara Nova Group (1921-26) and the ambiguities 
of Portuguese liberal elites”, Portuguese Studies, Voi. 4, 1988, pp. 182/195; "the Aesthetics of 
Nationalism: Modernism and Authoritarianism in Early Twentieth-Century Portugal", Luso Brazilian 
Review , Vol. XXVI, 1, 1989, pp. 15/43.
171 Cf. Manuel Villaverde Cabral, "Portuguese Fascism...", p. 3.




























































































will not review here, the latter, although found in works of a more amateur nature, was 
well defended from an academic point of view by José Machado Pais173.
The subject of the ideological and political origins of Salazarism is also to be 
found in the research of Manuel Braga da Cruz on the social Catholic movement and the 
Catholic Centre Party of which Salazar was leader. For him, this was the "original mould 
of Salazarism both politically and ideologically" which distinguishes it from European 
Fascism which was from a "secular" mould174. In the opinion of Braga da Cruz, the 
origins of Salazar's regime correspond more to the programme of social Catholicism and 
to that of the radical right represented by Integralism, perhaps the most important 
ideological pressure group during the crisis of the liberal regime. The predominance of 
the forms showed itself not only at a merely ideological level, but in the actual institutions 
of the regime, from corporatism to the single party and to the political élites themselves.
Regarding Integralism, a Portuguese version of Action Française, although it 
was central in the process of the overthrow of the liberal republic, it played a secondary 
role in the formation process of the "New State" and was an important source of Fascist 
disapproval when it was set up.
4.2. FASCISM OR AUTHORITARIANISM?
Although it has been latent in the most recent research, the interpretative debate 
on the characterization of the Portuguese regime has only been dealt with indirectly. In 
fact Portuguese research has not yet suffered rifts like those caused by De Felice in Italy 
or by the more recent German debate. Although there were several contributors on both 
sides, two authors basically reflected the two positions with regard to the Fascist or 
authoritarian nature of Salazar's regime and very little was added by others who were, in 
general, less concerned with the problems of characterizing the regime.
M. V. Cabral rejected a great part of the work produced by the political science 
which he considered to have failed in its attempts to classify Portugal's case and did not 
find the distinction between Fascism and authoritarianism viable. In Cabral's opinion 
"according to whether one puts the emphasis on Fascism as a movement or Fascism as a 
regime, the interpretations of the Portuguese case are bound to vary substantially." 
Giving priority to the form of the State and its structures and not the "choreographic”
173 Cf. José Machado Pais, As "Forças Vivas" e a Queda do Regime Liberal Republicano, Madrid, 
Unpublished Dissertation, 1983, and "A crise do regime liberal republicano: algumas hipdteses 
explicativas”, AA VV, 0  Estado Novo - das origens..., pp. 129/144.




























































































aspects, the Portuguese regime was one of the "most complete varieties (...) of 
Fascism.”175. Just like Lucena, Cabral emphasized that the form of the State under 
Salazarism "(...) after a brief period of military dictatorship, resembled the Italian regime 
more than any other authoritarian state of the inter-war period."176. Cabral went back to 
the positions which emphasised the differences between Italian Fascism and National 
Socialism as the former "comes closer to other Southern European authoritarianisms than 
to the German totalitarianism and to those unsuccessful totalitarian movements in other 
European developed countries which I will call Nazi.".
Both in Italy and Portugal any form of liberal mechanisms of representation, 
decision-making and legitimation of the political system was eradicated "drastically and 
durably, replacing them with an entirely new combination of ideological nationalism , 
social and economic corporatism, one-party state, plus systematic - as distinct from 
random - repression at all levels of social life."177. He also contested the positions of 
international researchers, especially Stanley Payne, who associated the "alleged 
conservative authoritarianism" in Portugal with that of Eastern Europe especially to that 
of Horthy and Pilsudsky as these two never eliminated pluralism and did not develop 
corporatist systems comparable to those of Portugal and Italy178.
Cabral's arguments are close to Lucena's, although the former, as we have seen, 
gives it a more "historical" content by stressing the similarities between the crisis of 
Portuguese liberalism and the crises at the time of the Fascist wave, and also the 
"Fascizing" traits of the pro-dictatorial reaction in the post-war period. Other positions 
similar to those mentioned above were taken up again in various empirical studies which 
will be discussed later, although they rarely dealt with the characterization of 
Salazarism179.
Taking the point of view criticised above, Braga da Cruz has based his argument 
precisely on the political science classics to build a typology of the relationship between 
the party and the State in the dictatorship in the period between the two world wars in 
order to find out if the "New State" was, in fact, Fascist or not"180. Agreeing with those
175 Vide Manuel Villaverde Cabral, "Sobre o Fascismo e o seu advento em Portugal: ensaio de 
interpretaçâo a pretexto de alguns livras récentes", Anâiise Social, Vol. XII(48), 1976, pp. 873/915; "O 
Fascismo Português numa Perspectiva Comparada" in AA.VV., 0  Fascismo em Portugal, 
(Lisboa: 1982), pp.19/30; "Portuguese Fascism in Comparative Perspective", (paper presented at the Xllth 
IPSA World Congress, Rio de Janeiro, August 1982).
170 Manuel Villaverde Cabral, "Portuguese Fascism...”, p. 3.
177 Idem, p. 3.
178 Idem, p. 24.
179 Cf. Fernando Rosas, "cinco pontos em tomo do estudo comparado do fascismo", Vèrtice, 13, Abril 
de 1989, pp. 21/29.
180 Cf. Manuel braga da Cruz, 0  Partido p. 11. Vide also his "El modelo politico salazarista", 





























































































who distinguished Fascism from the authoritarian regimes and emphasized the radical, 
modernizing character of the former, Braga da Cruz is of the opinion that the Portuguese 
regime was a governmental dictatorship and not, like Fascism, a party dictatorship. "If 
Fascism is authoritarianism", he stressed, "not all authoritarianisms were Fascist. (...) 
Fascism was merely one of several authoritarian nationalisms which appeared in the first 
quarter of the century, immediately after the war (,..)."181.
Inspired by the bibliography discussed in the first chapters of this work, Braga 
da Cruz put forward a typology of the relationship between the party and the State which, 
speaking simplistically, can be summarized as follows: if the party dominates the State in 
National Socialism and becomes part of it in Italian Fascism, in Portugal it depends on it 
entirely. Salazarism was, then, as opposed to Fascism, not a party dictatorship but a 
governmental dictatorship182. The conservative authoritarianism of the Portuguese 
regime was also distinguished (...) by any secular vision of the world or of life (...)" and 
its nationalism was a traditionalist, conservative and integrationist nationalism."183. It 
was also different in its political methods, "as opposed to Fascism, it was never intended 
to be founded on the role of the mobilized and organized masses in a single party nor in 
the totalization of the State's power (...). It was, rather, "an authoritarianism of extremely 
traditional domination and the markedly patronizing exercise of political power.”184
A similar position was defended by foreign political scientists who, although 
they were more interested in the subject of the transition to democracy in the seventies, 
wrote studies on Salazar's regime. They were generally introductory summaries, usually 
just a background to the study of the democratic regime established in 1974 and more 
based on the literature mentioned above. In the opinion of Thomas C. Bruneau, "the most 
accurate term for conveying the sense of what the Salazar regime was and how it operated 
is a conservative and authoritarian regime of personal rulership."185. Along Lawrence 
Graham's lines both Bruneau and Walter Opello emphasize the bureaucratic nature of the 
regime whose "linkages with the broader civil society were essentially administrative not 
political in character."186. It was also in studies on the fall of Salazarism that Manuel de 
Lucena refined his definition of the seventies starting with the distinction between
181 Idem, p. 30.
182 Cf. my review in, Annales ESC, mai-juin 1988, n°3, pp. 691/693.
183 Idem, p. 256.
184 Idem, p. 256/57.
183 Cf. Thomas C. Bruneau, Politics and Nationhood. Post-revolutionary Portugal, (New York: 1984), 
p. 18.




























































































Fascism and Nazism and insisting on the similarity between the Italian and Portuguese 
regimes187.
One final problem regarding the characterization of the regime lies in the division 
into different periods. Salazarism and Francoism were the only authoritarian regimes of 
the "Fascist Era" that survived 1945 and carried on into the seventies. This, as we have 
seen above, led some Spanish authors to consider the possibility of several 
characterizations according to the phase of the regimes.
This was not taken into consideration in the case of Portugal. Cabral mentioned 
the characterization of the regime as "Fascist" at least in the period between its 
establishment at the beginning of the thirties up to the Second World War188. Everyone 
else, however, suggested unique characterizations for Salazar's regime and did not 
consider the different phases important for the purpose of definition.
4.3. DEVELOPMENT OR STAGNATION?
The economic policy of the "New State” is perhaps the field which has been 
studied and debated most by modern research189. Its inclusion in the relations between 
Fascism and Salazar's regime is not direct as, for many authors, Fascism never had one 
economic policy which distinguished it clearly from other political regimes. In other 
words and returning to Alan Milward's question, the problem is to find out if, beyond the 
political sphere, there "was also a specific set of economic attitudes and policies which 
may equally aptly be labelled "Fascist?"190.
The debate on the "developing" or "stagnation" role of Salazar's regime in the 
sphere of Portuguese capitalism, as mentioned above, goes back to an important theme of 
the ideological struggle within the different political families of the opposition to the 
regime in the sixties which was later expressed in the academic field.
These works, most of which were part of the Marxist interpretations, placed the 
regime not only within the field of the development of the capitalist mode of production in 
Portugal but also in the field of the very political "recomposition” of the national ruling 
classes. They developed a whole series of reflections on the class content of the
187 v lcie [,is "Post-fascisme? neo-corporatisme? ou quoi (réfléxions sur la chute du régime salazariste et 
sur ce qui s'en est ensuivi)", paper presented to the Conference "Modem Europe after Fascism", Bergen, 
June 27-29 1985.
188 cf. Manuel Villaverde Cabral, " Portuguese Fascism...", p. 2.
189 vide, Eloy Fernandez Clemente, " A história econòmica de Portugal (séculos XIX e XX)”, Andlise 
Social, voi. XXIV(103-104), 1988 (4°, 5°), pp. 1318/1323.




























































































dictatorship and the role of the different factions of the bourgeoisie (agrarian, commercial 
and industrial)191.
The significance of some of the measures taken by the regime is relatively 
pacific. These measures are common to all the authoritarian and Fascist regimes of the 
period: the destruction of the trade union movement and its substitution by organizations 
of a corporatist type strictly controlled by the State; the adoption of an interventionist 
model substantiated by bureaucratic control through (or not) the same apparatus. 
Returning to Organski's works, the analysis of the weight of the rural and industrial élites 
and the accompanying ruralising resistance versus industrial development, o f the 
economic policy throughout the thirties was much less pacific.
Albeit with many nuances and lateral variations, two positions were formed. 
The first was the opinion of Cabral, according to whom the regime developed a "model 
of programmed stagnation" during this period as a result of the "historical compromise" 
on which it was based and owing to the political weight of the agrarian sector. Part of the 
"mystery" of the long life of the regime lay in this model as "the slower and more 
controlled the economic and social growth, the more chances there are of the inevitable 
effects of growth being absorbed without the model being endangered (...)"192. Cabral's 
position was supported by others who stressed the restrictive role of the regime's 
industrial development, in agreement with the ideology expressed by the regime in the 
thirties, and tried to prove that "the Salazar regime, while recognizing the need for 
industrial development, operated to control the pace of industrialization to prevent the 
formation of a potentially disruptive urban proletariat (...)''193. Of a slightly different 
opinion were the studies which, in the wake of Poulantzas' work, saw in the political 
economy of the regime a strong, interventionist State bringing about the transition from 
competitive to monopolistic capitalism and the progressive "submission of the different 
spheres of production to big industry"194.
On close examination the two positions tend to lose importance and most of the 
authors quoted did not disagree with the synthesis presented by Alfredo Marques on the 
political and social significance of the regime's economic strategy arising from 28th May 
1926. According to Marques, the economic policy of the thirties expressed a "class 
alliance” which he calls an "agrarian-industrial alliance (ALA)". Owing to the diversity of
191 For a review of the economic policy in the thirties, vide Fernando Rosas, O Estado Novo nos anos 
trinta. Elementos para o estudo da naturerà econòmica e social do salazarismo (1928-1938), (Lisboa: 
1986), pp. 23/53.
192 Cf. Manuel Villaverde Cabral, " Sobre o fascismo...”, p. 895.
193 Cf. Elizabeth Leeds, "Salazar's "modelo Econòmico": The Consequences of Planned Constraint”, in 
T. C. Bruneau, Victor M. P. da Rosa, and Alex Macleod (Edited By), Portugal in Development: 
emigration, industrialization, the European Community, (Ottawa: 1984), p. 13.
194 Cf. Joel Frederico da Silveira, "Alguns aspectos da politica econòmica do fascismo: 1926-19330", in 




























































































interests represented in these AIA "and to the incapacity for leadership of all its main 
components, the State took on the role of guarantor of the compatibility of this different 
interests and undertook a plan of action to reconcile their differences and alleviate their 
contradictions which, however, would only be possible through the maintenance of the 
status quo. This plan of action required not only the reinforced presence of the 
Administration but also the State's guardianship over the private economy. For this 
purpose, State jurisdiction was to achieve an extreme degree of autonomy in relation to 
the social forces with which it was closely united."195.
Fernando Rosas developed this thesis in a work in which he concentrated 
precisely on the political sense and the State's instruments of political intervention 
(basically through the corporatist apparatus) and in which he furthered the interconnection 
between the economic policy, the political system and the social classes. He took up a 
position between the two already mentioned. For him the "New State's" mission 
regarding the divided and crisis-stricken bourgeoisie was to "arbitrate" its contradictory 
interests, "to interpret them (...) as a whole and bring about the composition and balance 
of their different social aims and strategies."196. Rosas concentrated particularly on the 
contradictions between the agrarian and industrial sectors and rejected the idea that the 
economic policy of the thirties defended only agrarian interests since the data he presents 
show that there was "development, concentration and modernization of the industrially 
based sectors and of other more technologically advanced sectors (...)". He also 
recognised that this role of arbitrator "resulted in an economic policy which was generally 
contradictory, hesitant, often without any clearly discernible reason other than that of 
seeking the equilibrium and stability of the system even if it meant shaky overall growth, 
which was in fact the case"197.
Most of this initial research into the economic policy of the "New State” adopted 
the old Marxist debate on the role of Fascism as a response to the workers' offensive 
during the capitalist crisis in the imperialist phase even though it was attenuated by some 
of the problems inherent in the internal debate of the Portuguese political and intellectual 
élites. For example, it contested the idealistic vision of the liberal opposition which saw 
the "New State" as an irrational and "medieval" regression. This position, although based 
on a different theory, was sometimes taken up by the main clandestine opposition force to 
the regime, the Communist Party. Seen outside this context of ideological struggle, the 
different positions are not always discernible. Apart from the classical literature on the 
relationship between Fascism and capital, in the field of theoretical references this debate
195 Cf. Alfredo Marques, Politica Econòmica e Desenvolvimento Econòmico em Portugal (1926-1959), 
(Lisboa: 1988), p. 24.
19^ Cf. Fernando Rosas, Op. Cit., p. 121.




























































































revolved mainly around Organski and Poulantzas. They have, however, been quoted less 
in recent years and there have been fewer references to Fascism, either as a concept or as 
a historic experience.
There is still a need, in the comparative field, for works in the area of economic 
policy, like those by Manuel Lucena or Braga da Cruz in the political field. Although 
there are no comparative studies, some references contributed to Milward’s doubts, 
already quoted, and in Portugal's case added the problem of division into periods. 
According to Alfredo Marques, "if, in the whole period of the Portuguese dictatorship, 
there is a set of economic measures which reminds us in some way of the interventionism 
of "paradigmatic" European dictatorships (Germany and Italy) (...)", it was not that of 
the thirties but that of the fifties, when a strategy for "economic growth" was drawn 
up”198. The author considered this strategy to have been a failure in view of the 
resistance of the old AIA which proved its solid implantation in the "Portuguese 
economic and social structure."199
Some studies have also pointed out the singularity of Salazar's industrial policy 
with its extreme governmental bureaucratic control through the law o f "condicionamento 
industrial". After a comparative study of the models of intervention of Francoism and 
Italian Fascism, one author concludes that the extreme control and conditioning of 
Portuguese industrial development represented a "specific national solution"200. In its 
first phase, the "New State”, from the point of view of the inclusion of the variable 
economic policy in the individualisation of Fascism, seems therefore to contribute to new 
problems.
4.4 INTERNATIONAL FACTORS
International factors were not an important element in the overthrow of 
republican liberalism and the implantation of Salazarism. If there is anything to emphasise 
in this respect, it is exactly the opposite, i.e. the relative independence of internal political 
factors. Unlike the authoritarian experiences of the same period in the eastern European 
countries, Portugal's case was a typical example of the establishment of an authoritarian 
regime in a small country on the periphery of Europe, without any significant intervention 
from the dominant powers and of a genuinely native character.
198 Cf. Alfredo Marques, Op. Cit., p. 25.
199 idem, p. 26.
Cf. José Maria Brandâo de Brito, A Industrializaçâo Portuguésa no Pôs-guerra (1948-1965), O 




























































































The central focus of Portuguese foreign policy and the main concern of the 
national political élites from the end of the 19th century were the defence of the country's 
vast colonial heritage left by history and by British interests. Britain was the power which 
had dominated and guaranteed Portuguese independence since the 17th century. There 
was, in fact, no change in this respect between the liberal republican regime and Salazar's 
"New State".
Some research into British attitudes to the dictatorship lead us to conclude that 
the Foreign Office kept up with events without interfering but that it supported Salazar's 
rise to power201. This was a far cry from the time when it was the the British Embassy 
that gave orders, as in the 19th century and when their permission had to be obtained 
before beginning any break as was the case with the revolution of 1910. In the process of 
transition to authoritarianism: "if anything, the pattern of British attitudes towards the 
political events in Portugal during that period is one of expectancy."202. Especially since 
there were no signs of a change in foreign policy on the part of the Portuguese.
The only international event which was decisive and which had a significant 
impact on Portuguese internal policy was the crisis of the Republic and the subsequent 
civil war in Spain, which was felt to be a genuine threat to the consolidation of the 
regime203. The repressive clamp-down and the creation of para-military organizations 
which until then had not been planned and were actually viewed as hostile by Salazar are 
usually associated with this international event. This movement has been characterised by 
some historians as the driving force of what they called the "Fascistization" of the regime. 
In fact, organisations like the Portuguese Legion (1936) were formed during the Spanish 
Civil War and the youth organization itself - the Portuguese Youth (1936) - which had 
already been planned several times was created with great alacrity. It was also during this 
period that, for the first time, there was discourse and street choreography of a Fascist 
nature, which would lose its importance as soon as Franco's victory was assured after 
1938.
The situation in Spain dominated Portuguese foreign policy up to the tumning 
point of the Second World War. At first, Salazar supported the Francoist insurrection and 
discreetly opened his territory to them while formally remaining neutral. This was 
followed later by more open support but without ever endangering the Anglo-Portuguese 
alliance. After Franco's victory and during the first phase of the Second World War, the 
main concern of the Portuguese regime was to avoid Spain’s participation on the side of
201 Cf. Fernando Rosas, O Salazarismo e a Aliança Luso-Britânica, (Lisboa: 1988).
202 Cf. Manuel Villaverde Cabral, "Dependency and autonomy in Portuguese politics: authoritarianism 
and democracy in international perspective”, mimio., p. 18.
293 Cf. César Oliveira, Portugal e a Segunda Repâblica de Espanha, 1931-1936, (Lisboa: 1987) ; 0  
Salazarismo e a Guerra Civil de Espanha (Lisboa: 1988), and Hipôlito de la Torre Goméz, La Relaciôn 




























































































the Axis given Spain's membership in the Anti-Komintem Pact, in an attempt at 
maintaining the neutrality of the Iberian Peninsula.
Another interesting dimension, which has not received much attention, is the 
mistrust on the part of the "New State", both ideological and from the point of view of 
international relations, of German Fascism and, more strangely, of Italian Fascism. Even 
before the convergence of Rome and Berlin, when Fascist Italy made some 
"internationalist" efforts in the name of ’’Latinity” even in competition with Nazism, the 
regime's reaction was small and distrustful as proved by one of the few studies on the 
subject204. The invitations to take part in the C.A.U.R. were discreetly refused in the 
name of Portuguese independence and, in the field of international relations, Mussolini's 
colonial claims gave rise to a certain distrust on the part of the regime, which trembled at 
the slightest attempt to change the political balance in Africa.
Portuguese historians have contributed also towards clearing up doubts on the 
attitude of the regime towards the Second World War. Salazar's neutrality was genuine 
and not "forced" and used all the "concessions" to Britain to prove the country's 
progressive autonomy without ever endangering the guarantee of his colonial heritage205. 
Salazar was, in this respect, different from Franco who was closer to the Axis at least 
until the turn in the war and albeit with some reluctance in some sectors of Francoism's 
institutions.
4.5 THE SINGLE PARTY
The differences between the National Union and any Fascist party are easily 
recognizable even when, as in Italy, the party became dependent on the State. The non- 
Fascist nature of Salazar's party has always been used as a point of reference when trying 
to define the Portuguese regime.
The National Union was a creation of Salazar's, established and organized by 
governmental decree (legislation was passed on the party in the same way as on the 
administration of the railways) dominated by the administration, put to sleep and 
reawakened in accordance with the situation at the time. The single party of Salazarism 
was studied from a comparative point of view by Braga da Cruz. However, in view of 
the non-Fascist nature of the party and its governmental inspiration, its comparison with
204 Cf. Simon Kuin,"Fascist Italy and Salazar's Portugal, 1926-1936”, Yearbook o f European Studies, 
3-llaly/Europe, (Amsterdam: 1990), pp. 101/118.
205 Cf. António Telo, Portugal na Segunda Guerra, (Lisboa: 1987); AA.VV., Portugal na Segunda 
Guerra Mundial. Contributes para uma reavaliaçâo, (Lisboa: 1989); Fernando Rosas, Portugal entre a Paz 




























































































the Fascisms that came to power only emphasized the differences. A prospectively much 
more fruitful comparison should be made precisely with those parties which had similar 
origins, like the regimes of the same period which created parties from above, from the 
dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain (and even that of Francoism) to those of central 
and Eastern Europe. Indeed, from this point of view, considering the longevity of the 
Portuguese regime, the National Union made an extremely interesting case study on the 
functions of the parties which, unlike the Fascists, neither reached power at all nor, once 
created, fulfilled functions of control and monopoly of access to power or mobilization of 
the masses, which, in general, the Fascists did.
Some of the genetic and legitimizing functions in the process of the 
institutionalization of the "New State" were obvious. We should not forget that Salazar 
formed the regime from the military dictatorship established in 1926, based on 
heterogeneous support, functioning extremely unstably and permeated by many political 
clienteles. The resistance and competition both from the republican opposition and the 
Fascist party ( the National Syndicalists) on its creation were indicative of its original 
function, which Arlindo Caldeira summarized as: to support the monopolization of 
political power by the government, to neutralize all forces likely to dispute Salazar's 
power, to legitimize the regime through elections, to unite the different factions and 
oblige them to solve possible conflicts inside the National Union, so as not to destabilize 
the regime206.
The National Union seems to have been an empty, undermined space into which 
were formally sent (generally by repressive means, as in the case of the Fascists, 
organized autonomously during the military dictatorship) those who wanted to join the 
regime and which, once full, was closed. The army was kept away from public life. 
Political activity was now prohibited outside public life which was by no means small, 
as, apart from the Fascists, the Catholics and Monarchists, who still had some power 
over the military, were still legally organized.
Several authors have already mentioned the absence of the role of ideology, 
propaganda or mobilization of the masses on the part of the National Union which is 
easily visible from the fact that the party all but disappeared during the thirties. The party 
was reawakened in 1945 when, in an adverse international situation, the regime permitted 
the appearance of an electoral opposition, always under control, and it was therefore 
necessary to encourage votes for the government's lists. However, even this action to 
ensure victory was more administrative than political as electoral motivation, even for 
propaganda purposes, was always avoided and in fact demotivation was openly 
encouraged. The National Union was also not the exclusive channel of access to political
Cf. Arlindo Manuel Caldeira, ”0  partido de Salazar: antecedentes, organizaçâo e funçôes da Uniâo 




























































































office, from the Corporatist Chamber to Ministers and Secretaries of State, who did not 
pass through the party. It did have some control over access to the lower echelons of the 
civil service where it was essential to join the party in order to be admitted. As Braga da 
Cruz says, however, "its importance grew as one went from central administration to 
local administration.”207. The social composition of the party also distinguishes it from 
Fascism. The National Union had none of the petit bourgeois, popular and much less 
working class components typical of the Fascist parties and their "social" demagogy. Its 
composition pointed rather to the typical point of confluence of local notables: 
landowners and businessmen formed most of its local committees in the thirties208.
The provinces with their local influence constitute a wide Field for research to 
help us understand better the role of the party. This field has, unfortunately, been studied 
very little. It should not be forgotten that the "New State" did not succeed a democracy 
but a clientelistic and oligarchic republic based on restricted electoral participation with 
some obvious points of continuity inherited from the old constitutional monarchy of the 
19th century209. Although it changed the rules of the game, the National Union was a 
central instrument in the reconverting of the local notables as has been proved by one of 
the rare case studies written210. It was in this field that we feel its role was most 
important.
4.6 THE MILITARY
The military were the main participants in the different processes of political 
disruption in Portugal in the 20th century and it was they who were responsible for the 
beginning and the end of the "New State”211. They were the only institution that Salazar 
feared and indeed theirs were the most threatening initiatives to overthrow him. The only 
time in the regime when the dictatorship hung by a tread, at the beginning of the sixties 
when the colonial war broke out, was due to high-ranking military officers. It was also a
2117 Cf. Manuel Braga da Cruz, 0  Partido..., p. 177.
298 Ariindo Caldeira, " O partido de Salazar...", p. 960 and Manuel Braga da Cruz, O Partido... p. 
234.
29° For a review of political clientelism in modem Portugal, cf. Fernando Farelo Lopes, "Panorama de la 
Litérature sur le Clientélisme au Portugal", C. E. M. O J .  /., n“ 9, F.N.S.P., Paris, Janvier 1990, pp. 
85/90.
219 cf. Rui Ramos, "O Estado Novo perante os poderes periféricos: o governo de Assis Gonçalves em 
Vila Real (1934-39)", Anâlise Social, vol.XXII (90), 1986, pp. 109/135.
211 Cf. ioào B. Serra and Luis Salgado de Matos, "IntervençOes Militares na Vida Politica”, Anâlise 
Social, (72-73-74), Is vol., 1982, pp. 1165/1195. For a general introduction cf. Maria Carrilho, Forças 





























































































dissident officer, General Humberto Delgado, who was the unifying force of the serious 
"electoral” shock of 1958 caused by the opposition movements.
Most of the research has concentrated on the study of the military institution and 
its relationship with the Republic212. We now know considerably more about the 
republicans' inability to reform the armed forces, the impact of Portugal's participation in 
World War I, the politicization of the army after the war and the influence of the radical 
right within its ranks213. On the other hand the essential facts of the plot behind the 
conspiracy which led to the coup d'état of 1926 were reconstructed quite accurately even 
if a certain deterministic finality did dominate some of the relations between cause and 
effect which they established214.
Less attention has been given to the withdrawal of the military from the political 
limelight with the consolidation of the authoritarian order and to the type of relationship 
the "New State" had with the military in which it successfully "civilized" the dictatorship 
established in 1926. The Fascists and radical right had considerable influence over the so- 
called "lieutenants of the 28th of May”. Those members of the military hierarchy who 
occupied political posts, including several prime ministers, were conservative republicans 
and frowned on Salazar's strategy, like Vicente de Freitas or Ivens Ferraz215. General 
Carmona, President of the Republic after 1928, was sensitive to any attempts to relegate 
the Armed Forces to second place and had more power in the thirties than his feeble 
image of the post-war period might lead one to believe.
In spite of this and of the tensions which existed in the relationship between the 
regime and the military institution, there seems to be no doubt that the "New State" 
removed the military from the political limelight, established a new type of relationship 
between the political powers and the Armed Forces and ensured a relatively peaceful 
domination over them at least until the end of World War II216. The corporatist 
compensations given to the military institution were substantial but some of them, at least 
as far as the immunity of members of the military before civilian courts and police was 
concerned, came from the First Republic and, moreover, some of these reforms hit some 
privileges hard217. The mere coincidence between the spontaneous ideology of the 
"order" that most of the military adopted and the nature of the regime is not enough to
212 Cf. Douglas L. Wheeler, Republican Portugal. A Political History, 1910-1926, (Madison: 1978).
213 Cf. António José Telo, Decadendo e Queda da 1 Repùblica Portuguesa, Is voi, (Lisboa: 1980); 
Douglas L. Wheeler, A Ditadura Militar Portuguesa, 1926-1933, (Lisboa: 1988).
214 Cf. António José Telo, Op. Cit„ 2* voi., (Lisboa: 1984).
215 Cf. César Oliveira (Prefàcio e notas), A ascensào de Salazar. Memórias de seis meses de Governo - 
1929- de generai Ivens Ferrai, (Lisboa: 1988).
216 Cf. Douglas L. Wheeler "The Military and the Portuguese Dictatorship, 1926-1974: "The Honor of 
the Army”, In Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler (Edited by), Op. Cit., pp. 191/219.
217 Vide Tom Gallagher, "Fernando dos Santos Costa: guardiSo militar do Estado Novo 1944-1958”, in 




























































































explain everything and some of these privileges disappeared in 1945 to be followed by 
strict police control over the military institution after the attempts to overthrow the regime 
associated with the "democratic opposition" began again.
4.7 THE OPPOSITION
The only study of the opposition to the "New State" concentrated on the period 
between World War II and its fall in 1974218. Unfortunately we know a lot less about the 
resistance movement to the establishment of the Military Dictatorship and to the 
consolidation of Salazarism and even about some Fascist opposition.
After numerous attempts at revolutions on the part of the republicans and the 
destruction of anarcho-syndicalism as a dominant force in the workers' movement, it was 
the small communist party which rose rapidly to the leadership of the clandestine 
opposition to the regime. In contrast to the opposition to other regimes of the same type, 
Portugal did not have an important opposition in exile (it only reappeared in the 
sixties)219. After the fall of the Spanish Republic and the dissolution of some of the 
movements of exiled republicans at the end of the twenties, it was inside the country and 
using all possible legal spheres of action that the opposition gradually reorganised to 
emerge in the forties with a certain strength220. Although it is only after 1945 that one can 
talk of an "electoral opposition" to Salazarism, it was able to continue in various legal 
publications which, in spite of tough censorship, survived in the thirties.
This change in the opposition to the regime was mirrored in the composition of 
the political prisoners between 1933 and 1939. There was not only a spectacular increase 
in their numbers during the Spanish Civil War, which clearly expressed the regime's 
tougher repressive measures, but they were also mainly workers and members of the 
communist party221. For the period in which we are interested, 1933-1945, there are few 
studies of the opposition movements and of the analysis that these movements made of 
the nature of the regime222.
21 ̂  Cf. Dawn Linda Raby, Fascismo and Resistence in Portugal. Communists, liberals and military 
dissidents in the opposition to Salazar, 1941-1974, (Manchester 1988).
219 Cf. the comparative chapter of Stanley G. Payne, ” la oposición a las dictaduras en la Europa 
occidental: una perspectiva comparativa” in Javier Tusell et alii. La Oposición al Régimen de Franco, 3 
vols. (Madrid: 1990), pp. 51/64.
220 vide A.H. Oliveira Marques, A Liga de Paris e a Diladura Militar, 1927-1928, (Lisboa: 1976) and A 
literatura Clandestina em Portugal, 1926-1932,2 vols. (Lisboæ 1990-1991).
221 Vide some articles of José Pacheco Pereira and Joâo Arsénio Nunes in the collective works quoted 
above.





























































































The balance of more recent Portuguese research is far from exhausted and we 
have only discussed the interpretation of the most important studies with regard to 
relations between Salazar's regime and European Fascism. In the last few years a large 
number of monographs have contributed towards improving our empirical knowledge of 
Salazarism. In spite of the significant absence of work on most of the regime’s 
institutions, especially those which were most inspired by Fascism, some of the variables 





























































































5. PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES OF INTERPRETATION
Whether we consider it as a movement or as a regime, Fascism was a variety on 
a whole spectrum of authoritarian reactions in the 20th century. From a historical 
perspective, Fascism was represented by the Italian and German dictatorships. It was in 
association with their specific characteristics and with those responsible for the overthrow 
of the regimes which preceded them that the identifying elements of the Fascist paradigm 
were consolidated. The adoption of maximalist definitions, which were periodically 
revived in the political field, was not effective in the analysis of other dictatorships which 
sprung up here and there all over the world, in spite of the fact that some of these regimes 
took on some of the characteristics223. As a form of political regime, its most obvious 
feature when we compare Fascism with other dictatorial reactions of the same period was 
the totalitarian tension which pervaded its institutions and its relationship with society. 
This tension is indissolubly linked with the fact that a Fascist party took charge of the 
transition and consolidation of the new regime. Although all the dictatorships of the 
period share a considerable common nucleus with Fascism and, in some cases, were 
inspired on it when creating some of their institutions, they are still different in that one 
essential aspect.
5.1 FASCISM AND THE CRISIS OF PORTUGUESE LIBERALISM
Only recently a student of Fascism suggested a return to the origins and stressed 
the importance of going back to the study of the crisis which made way for it224. The 
amount of literature on the crisis of the democracies after Word War I has never ceased to 
grow and rejects many monocausal simplisms on the origins of the authoritarian and 
Fascist regimes. The authors are, however, all unanimous on one conclusion: that 
Fascism was one of several possible dictatorial options and that it was not insignificant 
that it was Fascism that took power and not some other conservative or radical right 
coalition.
The crisis of Portuguese liberalism goes back, above all, to the problem of the 
complex relationship between Fascism and the different political families into which
223 Cf. Helgio Trindade, "la question du fascisme en Amérique Latine", mimio., Florence, Novembre 
1982.




























































































conservatism was divided in the first half of the 20th century. It seems clear today that the 
rise of Fascism was only possible in coalition with ideologies, factions and the electorate 
which up to then had been represented by different conservative parties. But mixing them 
together does not help us to understand their novelty and singularity. As Blinkhom said 
"It cannot seriously be denied that as movements, parties and political ideologies, 
conservatism and fascism occupied very different positions within the early and mid­
twentieth century European right, converging at some points and conflicting at 
others.”225
Some structural factors seem to immediately eliminate some of the classic themes 
of Fascism and go back to specific aspects of Portuguese political and social evolution 
since the end of the 19th century. As we have already pointed out, when Portugal entered 
the maelstrom whipped up by the First World War, she lacked some of the disturbances 
mentioned by students of Fascism in the field of the relationship between home and 
foreign policy. Portugal had already basically solved the "national question”: the "state" 
and the "nation" got on well and shared a significant cultural uniformity; she had no 
national or ethnic and cultural minorities; she had no territorial claims in Europe; she lay 
within the British sphere of influence which guaranteed her vast colonial heritage; the 
"age of the masses" arrived with none of the mobilizing themes of radicalism normally 
associated with the fascist movements. Moreover this "massification of politics" should 
be moderate in the case of Portugal.
In the second half of the 19th century Portugal could be categorized as a non- 
industrialised country with a stable "oligarchic parliamentarism". The dynamic of its 
social and economic change did not much differ from other semi-peripheral countries that 
Nicos Mouzelis has defined as having an "early parliamentarism and late 
industrialization"226. Turning to the exploitation of the colonial African patrimony while 
timidly bringing out an industrializing policy based on "import-substitution", this 
oligarchic and clientelistic liberalism would begin to come apart at the turn of the century. 
The emergence of the republican movement which would mobilize large sections of the 
urban middle (and popular) classes until then "excluded" from politics, was expressive of 
that crisis227.
Some of the sources of mobilization of the first Fascist movements were, in fact, 
represented in Portugal, in a varied combination, by important sectors of the Republican 
movement, especially by its rough, Jacobin component, with its nationalist and anti­
clerical authoritarianism, and this has led some authors to consider it a type of "proto-
225 Cf. Martin Blinkhom (edited by), Fascists and Conservatives, (London: 1990), p.13.
226 Cf. Nicos P. Mouzelis, Politics in the Semi-Periphery. Early Parliamentarism and Late 
Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America, (London: 1986).





























































































Fascism"228. Whether one agrees with this controversial theory or not, the truth is that 
the Portuguese case is, as Juan Linz said, a good illustration of the difficulty experienced 
by the Fascist movements in political situations where powerful "competitors” occupied 
parts of their potential political space229.
The republican élites adopted the programme of universal suffrage, anti­
clericalism and nationalism based on the fight against British dependence and on the 
defence of Portugal's colonial heritage. As early as 1910, legislation for rapid 
secularization was passed and there was a strong, urban, anti-clerical movement. These 
measures, mostly inspired by those taken 5 years earlier by the Third French Republic, 
had a profound impact on the Catholic hierarchy. But suffrage was not to be extended 
after all, on the pretext of the first monarchic revolts which broke out in Spain and the 
Democratic Party, which inherited part of the electoral caciquism of the liberal monarchy, 
rapidly became the ruling party. Portugal's participation in the First World war, defended 
by the Republicans as a way of protecting her colonial heritage, and the crisis which 
ensued served only to emphasize the crisis of the legitimacy of liberal parliamentarism.
The small but pugnacious workers' movement of anarcho-sindicalist hegemony 
frightened the ruling classes in face of the republican regime's notorious inability to 
promote its inclusion. However, the role played by the Portuguese "bienio rosso" in the 
authoritarian wave which overthrew Portuguese liberalism should not be exaggerated. 
Some economic and social cleavages superimposed themselves on this wave among the 
factors contributing to the fall of the Republic. To quote Qrganski's model, cleavages like 
those between city and country or traditional and modem élites were typical of a "dual 
society” like that in Portugal in the twenties and are more use when analysing the fall of 
Portuguese liberalism than the cleavage between the industrial bourgeoisie and the 
working class.
When analysing some of the structural factors affecting the instability of the First 
Republic, some researchers have proved, with solid arguments, that the conflict between 
the agrarian and industrial sectors, which derived from Portugal's semi-peripheral 
position, and the impossibility of parliamentary unification was a decisive factor and that 
the situation was made worse by the post-war crisis230. On the political level, 
conservative dominance was evident, from the republican parties to the associations of 
interest, in the whole process of the fall of the republic.
228 Cf. Mario Baptista Coelho, 0  Republicanismo Nacionalista e Autoritàrio em Portugal. Do 
radicalismo nacionalista ao proto-fascismo dual (1903-1928)-Um ensaio critico e interpretativo, Lisboa, 
mimio., 1987.
229 Cf. Juan J. Linz, "Political Space ans Fascism as a Late-Comer", Stein Ugelvik Larsen et alii 
(Edited by), Op. Cit., pp. 153/189.
230 Cf. Kathleen C. Schwartzman, The Social Origins of the Democratic Collapse. The First Portuguese 




























































































The military coup of 28th May 1926 which ended the parliamentary republic was 
not only a praetorian military intervention in political life. Republican liberalism was 
overthrown by an army divided and politicized mainly by Portugal's participation in 
World War I and receiving calls for a coup from organized fractions within its ranks 
ranging from conservatives republicans to social Catholics and the integralist extreme 
right and its respective Fascist appendices which particularly influenced the young 
officers. Let us not forget that these officers constituted the base of the first modern 
dictatorship established in Portugal, the brief dictatorship of Siddnio Pais (1917-18), 
which already showed, with its anti-plutocratic populism, some of the traits of Fascism.
The influence that these ideological agents had was obviously not equal. The 
main ones were, without doubt, the integralists and the Catholics. The former, 
traditionalist monarchists, made integral corporatism their alternative base to liberalism 
and emphasized ruralist and anti-cosmopolitanist values. The latter also maintained these 
values but adopted the corporatism of the papal encyclicals and, although almost all 
monarchists, adopted a pragmatic attitude of acceptance of the republican formula. 
However, they shared the anti-liberal intransigence of the integralists with a more 
concrete programme to strengthen the influence of the church and directly voiced the 
opinions of a religious hierarchy deeply shaken by republican anti-clericalism and its 
programme of secularization.
Some researchers have tried to "solve" the absence of a Fascist movement in 
Portugal by drawing attention to its contribution, albeit fragmented and weak, towards 
the movement which led to the overthrow of liberalism. This rather voluntarist exercise 
was hasty and showed little sensitivity to scale. Attempts were made to prove that 
Portugal, after all, had everything that the classics pointed out as the "origins" of Fascism 
(modernism and futurism, nationalism, traumas from the first world war, a workers' 
offensive, anti-communism, young military politicized by the extreme right, the Avant la 
lettre Fascism of Sidonio Pais, "massification of politics", liberalism's legitimacy crisis 
and even Fascists...). One should, however, note the scale and explain why fascists were 
not the the protagonists either in the overthrow of liberalism or in the authoritarian order 
which followed231.
In the Portuguese case, the main factor to emphasize for the purpose of 
comparison was the absence of a Fascist movement in the overthrow of liberalism and in 
the building of the authoritarian order. The very coalition of political forces which 
supported its overthrow was characterized from the start by a predominance of 
conservative and radical right-wing parties. Fascism, now seen as a movement, was the
231 Cf. Anlonio Costa Pinto, "O fascismo e a crise da 1* Republica: os nacionalistas lusitanos (1923- 




























































































eternal loser in 1925/26, during the Military Dictatorship and in the thirties when Salazar 
was already in power.
As soon as the Republican regime was overthrown, the Military Dictatorship 
immediately found negative solutions for some of the problems dear to the conservative 
bloc. The Democratic Party was ousted from power and its leaders exiled, the working 
class lost its right to strike and its unions saw its room for legal manoeuvre considerably 
restricted. The revolutionary attempts against the dictatorship were made almost 
exclusively by the republicans, with the exception of a failed general strike in 1934 when 
Salazar established the corporatist system. The Catholic Church, although cautiously in 
view of the presence of many republican military and civilians, blessed the coup and 
immediately offered its secular members for possible ministerial positions.
Salazarism grew up from the Military Dictatorship established in 1926, a quite 
instable regime. The Dictatorship imposed by the military was permeated by a succession 
of conspiracies, palace coups and even attempts at revolution, which clearly expressed 
the fight for leadership within the vast conservative coalition on which it was based. The 
difficulties in consolidating an authoritarian regime followed one by one given the 
political diversity of the conservative bloc and its ability to penetrate the armed forces232. 
Curiously, it was under the Military Dictatorship that the Fascists enjoyed some 
influence, owing to their presence in the corps of young officers, attempted to create 
some autonomous organizations and played a role in driving out the republican military 
component. It was this "limited and self-devouring pluralism" with the military as 
mediators that Salazar progressively dominated.
In 1930 the National Union was created by law, an "anti-party" to aggregate the 
civilian forces that supported the new regime. In 1933 a new Constitution declared 
Portugal a "Unitarian and corporatist republic”. A compromise between liberal and 
corporatist principles of representation, the former were perverted by subsequent 
legislation and the latter limited and relegated to the background. The result was a 
Dictatorship of the "Prime Minister", a National Assembly occupied by the National 
Union in non competitive elections. To avoid any loss of power, even to a House 
dominated exclusively by the government party, the executive was made almost 
completely autonomous. General Carmona remained President to guarantee military 
interests. The censorship services eliminated any suggestion of political conflict and 
devoted their attention both to the opposition and, at first, to the Fascist minority of Rolao 
Preto which insisted on challenging the new regime233. The political police were also 
reorganized and used with remarkable rationality. All this was done "from above"
232 Cf. Antonio Costa Pinto, "The Radical Right and the Military Dictatorship in Portugal: the 28 May 
league (1928-33), Luso-Brazilian Review, Vol. 23 (Summer 1986), pp. 1/15.




























































































without any particular Fascist demagogy and relied more on Generals and Colonels than 
on Lieutenants, more on the Ministry of the Interior than on the streets. By 1934, after a 
few hitches, liberalism had been eliminated and the old republican institutions replaced.
The more rebellious fascist leaders were exiled but most of them "got jobs" in 
minor positions, especially when the Spanish Civil War gave the regime a fright some 
years later. The great republican figures were forgotten in exile after the brief optimism 
caused by the Spanish popular front. The anarcho-syndicalist leaders one by one went to 
prison or died in Spain leaving the leadership of the clandestine opposition to the small 
and young communist party.
The regime institutionalized by Salazar was admired by wide fringes of the 
European radical right, above all by those of Maurrazian and Catholic traditional origins, 
because the "New State" expressed a very similar cultural origin. This identity went 
beyond the mere "order” programme but, on the other hand, did not include the 
"totalitarian", "pagan" aspects that were bringing Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy closer 
and closer. It is in the ideological spectrum o f radical right and anti-liberal social 
Catholicism that the cultural and political origins of Salazar's regime are to be found 234.
5.2 THE "NEW STATE'S POLITICAL SYSTEM AND FASCISM
Although the construction of some of the institutions of Salazarism was inspired 
by Fascisms in power, particularly on that of Italy, it voluntarily refused the elements that 
made it different. It adopted the elements which tended to unite the right-wing 
dictatorships of the period and rejected precisely those which only characterized Fascism. 
This differentiation was visible in the leadership, in the function of the political system 
and its way of relating to society.
Many studies of modem dictatorships, whether because of a theoretical point of 
view or because of the pragmatic character of the dictator, ignore the leader. In the case of 
the "New State" it would be a mistake to do so. Salazar came from a particular political 
milieu but in fact he had a world view, ran the whole institutional design of the regime 
and, once he had become unchallenged leader, little legislation, from the most important 
to the most trivial, could be published without his approval until he became decrepit in the 
sixties235. Salazar always kept some ideological traits which derived from the cultural
234 On the concept of radical right, cf. the recent Roger Eatwell and Noel O'Sullivan, (Edited By), The 
Nature of the Right, (London: 1989).
235 We are still waiting for a good biography of Salazar, meanwhile see the one written by one of his 




























































































magma from which he came: Catholic integralism of the traditionalistic and anti-liberal 
mould in a context of secularization and accelerated modernization which, for him, 
symbolized the First Republic. He was ultra-conservative in the most literal sense of the 
term. He steadfasdy defended his preliminary rejection of democracy and its ideological 
heritage based on an "organicist" vision of society of traditionalistic and Catholic origins. 
As he ran the country he was aware of the inevitability of this modernization but always 
thought of the survival and well-being that was threatened by it. Everything else derived 
from or was added to this. The addition, moreover, was not insubstantial as, unlike other 
dictators, he was a professor of finance and had clear ideas about the management of a 
State's balance sheet. Portugal's dictator rejected Fascism's model of charismatic 
leadership both from ideological training and from political choice and not for pragmatic 
reasons and even less out of suitability to any characterial nature of Portuguese society, 
the social structure of which was not unlike many of those which underwent a populism 
closer to Fascism.
As far as the regime's political institutions were concerned, the demarcation 
from the Fascist paradigm was also clear in the single party right from the beginning. In 
view of the non-Fascist nature and governmental inspiration of the party, its comparison 
with the Fascisms that rose to power merely served to emphasize the differences, as we 
have already seen above.
The presence of the single party in Portugal was not an important factor in the 
formation of Salazarism's political élite as its functions in this field were limited236. Its 
presence did, however, strengthen Salazar's authority and limited the organization of 
blocs and pressure groups in its absence and allowed it a certain "technocratic" pluralism 
of choice. According to the 1933 Constitution, The National Assembly would consist of 
two Houses that of Deputies elected by direct suffrage and the Corporatist Chamber, 
which would constitute the top of the corporatist system. The House of Deputies was 
filled by the National Union and the Corporatist Chamber, due to the lack of 
Corporations, was coopted among the "forças vivas". The first parliamentary elections, 
held in 1934, had clear legitimizing intentions. In general these elections were 
synonymous with the non-mobilizing character of the regime. Held regularly, they were 
always acts in which there was never any intention of even simulating the 99%. The civil 
servants were mobilized and within an already restricted number of registered voters, the 
electoral rolls were manipulated to correct any imbalances.
236 In Francoism, the single party was much more important in this field. Vide Miguel Jerez Mir, 




























































































This characteristic of the Portuguese regime separated it from the typical tension 
between party and state in Fascism237. In fact the opposite was the case in that its 
dependence on the State was characteristic of the life of the National Union right from the 
beginning and they often merged; The "New State" was never a "dual State" and Salazar 
governed over and with the administrative apparatus while relegating the really "political" 
institution to second place.
The same administrative vocation was visible in the regime's corporatist 
apparatus. As far as the "third way" ideologies are concerned, corporatism was the prime 
candidate of the "New State". It was provided for in the 1933 Constitution and played a 
central role in the institutional structure, in the ideology, in relations with the social 
groups and in the State's economic policy under Salazarism. The declaration of the 
principles of Portuguese corporatism was influenced by its Italian counterpart but was 
moderated by the doctrine of social Catholicism. On the other hand, the 1933 
Constitution did offer to the "organic elements” the monopoly of representation that the 
radical right wanted.
Corporatism was one of the elements of the Italian version of Fascism and 
covered a wide ideological spectrum of the anti-democratic right since the beginning of 
the century, but Italy was far from having a monopoly. As far as authoritarian regimes 
were concerned corporatism was not a specific element of Fascism and it is actually 
doubtful whether it can be mentioned in the case of German Nazism238. It did, however, 
constitute a central element of legitimation for most of the post-war authoritarianisms like 
those of Austria, Spain, Romania or Vichy.
Corporatism was relegated to second place in the political system of the "New 
State". The electoral principle was maintained and the Corporatist Chamber in a National 
Assembly which had hardly any power anyway had only consultative powers. The 
corporatist building itself was never completed, contrary to the original plans. However, 
its functions, whether in the State's economic policy or as a buffer for social conflict 
were worthy of more detailed study as they reflected the regime's economic and social 
project. Since there were no actual Corporations, which should have represented the 
"organic elements of the nation" in the Corporatist Chamber, neither were there a whole 
lot of intermediate organizations (there was a rupture between the bases and the members 
of the Chamber which the State maintained), the Procurators were chosen by the 
"Corparatist Council". This council, however, consisted of Salazar and the ministers and 
secretaries of state for the sectors involved.
237 Cf. Emilio Gentile, "Le Rôle du Parti dans le Laboratoire Totalitaire Italien" and Philippe Burrin, 
"Politique et Société: Les structures du pouvoir dans L'Italie Fasciste et L'Allemagne Nazie", Annales 
ESC, mai-luin 1988, n° 3, pp. 556/591 and 615/637.





























































































It would be difficult to fully comprehend the political system and the ideological 
foundations of the "New State" without going over the determinant influence played by 
the traditionalist Catholicism present in all of the regime's major texts and institutions, 
from the Constitution to the declaration of the principles of corporatism, from the 
weakness of the party and the paramilitary organizations to the propaganda. Many of the 
definitions of the type "clerico/..." analysed above tried to include this essential 
component but some of the Fascist choreography of Salazarism in the thirties, associated 
with MP or the LP, seems to have received more attention. It is a dimension which 
should be compared with regimes like that of Franco, Dolfuss and even Vichy, since they 
all received important support and also because they were both constructed after 
republican secularization programs.
The Portuguese Catholic Church did not contribute only towards the ideological 
mould of the regime. Apart from all the Catholic symbolism that the regime used with the 
explicit approval of the Church hierarchy, one can even talk of a "Christianization" 
political programme which could be found in all the institutions, especially those more 
given to socialization like the school system.
When in 1936 some organizations directly inspired on Fascism were created, 
like the MP which was a para-military youth organization depending on the Ministry of 
Instruction or the LP, a voluntary anti-communist militia which was a result of the so- 
called "red peril” in Spain, they were immediately taken over by the religious services, 
which could be found everywhere in both institutions, In the case of youth organization 
which was indeed a sensitive matter in relations between the Church and the State in the 
Fascist regimes, care was taken to neither dissolve nor integrate the catholic organizations 
(which maintained their autonomy) and to ensure their influence on the official 
organization. The close association between the Church and the state in Salazarism went 
way beyond a mere convergence of interests and one could talk a an ideological and 
political nucleus common to the church and the regime from corporatism to anti-liberalism 
and anti-communism.
5. 3 AUTHORITARIANISM, STATE AND SOCIETY
M any s tu d en ts  o f F ascism  who used  the b inom ia l 
authoritarianism/totalitarianism tended to emphasize the fact that regimes like Salazarism 
were non-mobilizing. If this is understood merely as synonymous with an absence of 
extensive mobilization and of totalitarian tendencies, this position is certainly correct. 




























































































in the traditional instruments like the Church and the provincial élites than in mass 
organizations. It did however protect its interests in the field of relations with society by 
creating a whole cultural and socializing apparatus directly inspired by Fascism.
Corporatism was never completed within the political and institutional apparatus 
but was, at least, the official cultural model of the "New State". An eminently 
"organicistic" conception dominated the image that the regime tried to project of itself and 
of the country. As far as propaganda was concerned, it could be said that it was the 
project of the Integralist radical right with the blessing of social Catholicism that was 
applied. It was indeed in the cultural field that the similarities to regimes like that of Vichy 
were most obvious239.
In 1933, the regime created the Secretariat for National Propaganda headed by 
Antonio Ferro. In the cultural field, Ferro had nothing to do with Salazar and was a 
cosmopolitan journalist with connections in futurist and modernist circles and had been 
an admirer of Fascism since the twenties240. He enjoyed the dictator's confidence and, 
depending on him directly, Ferro created a machine which greatly exceeded the mere 
needs of the management of Salazar's image. Although he had little to do with the 
Leader's provincial integrism, or precisely because of this, Antonio Ferro gave the 
regime a "cultural project" which skillfully combined "modem" aesthetic resources with a 
true "re-invention of tradition". It was the SPN that coordinated and fed the regime’s 
press, that ran the censorship services, that organized the mass demonstrations that were 
transported to the capital from time to time, and that encouraged the leisure activities 
directed at the popular classes in close association with the corporatist apparatus. If this 
was not enough, it also organized numerous activities directed towards the élites and 
motivated cultural relations with foreign countries. For these activities the SPN was 
skillful in recruiting intellectuals and artists who, without the "modernistic" intervention, 
would hardly have been attracted by the profile of the Head of Government and some.of 
whom had been militants in the Fascist groups which opposed Salazar.
This cultural combination of the modern and the traditional was openly 
dominated by the latter. As other similar regimes, Salazarism's cultural project sought the 
"systematic restoration of Traditional Values."241. Particular attention was given to a 
whole "ethnographic/folkloric" movement which included revitalizing (pure fabrication in 
most cases) local folk groups, restoring the symbols of Christian reconquest and their 
social use, contests like "the most Portuguese village in Portugal". The culmination of 
this movement, at the beginning of the forties, was the "Exhibition of the Portuguese
239 Cf. Antonio Costa Pinto, "L'Etat Nouveau" de Salazar et le Régime de Vichy- Problèmes de 
Comparaison”, AA. VV„ Le Régime de Vichy et les Français, (Paris: 1991) (Forthcoming).
240 Vide Artur Portela, Salazarisme e Arles Plâslicas, (Lisboa: 19S2).
241 Cf. Christian Faure, Le projet Culturel de Vichy. Folklore et révolution nationale, 1940-1944, 




























































































World" which reproduced the traditional forms and habits of the populations of the whole 
"empire”. Another important revelation was the promotion of Portuguese cinema which 
transmitted the vindication of the healthy values of Christian honesty and of the poor but 
honourable family.
The selective orientation of the censorship was also a clear indication of the 
"organicist" ideal type. In a society where conflict had theoretically been abolished, 
nothing was published that might testify to its survival. Indeed the regime did not ban or 
systematically dissolve the publications which supported the opposition. These 
publications survived throughout the thirties, isolated or reduced to an intellectual 
readership and were able to debate the social significance of art or the German-Soviet pact 
as long as they stayed strictly within the limits of the Lisbon cafés and did not reach the 
working class, as Salazar had no fears for the rural and provincial bastions and trusted 
the traditional frameworks. As Salazar said one day "politically speaking, there exists 
only what the public knows to exist (...)"242, and in the field of the compulsory "social 
peace” the censors were ruthless.
The school system received almost obsessive attention from the regime. 
Religious instruction was reintroduced in state schools and literally inundated the 
curricula particularly in primary schools, which were the symbol and pride of republican 
secularly, where a detailed set of rules was adopted together with the new programmes. 
Parallel to this, a nationalistic and traditionalistic revision of Portuguese history was 
introduced. If its attitudes to the school system are gauges of its strategies against 
modernization, the "New State's" reforms expressed an accentuated fear of literacy and 
were characterized, apart from the radical alteration in the content of the syllabuses, by a 
veritable "educational stagnation"243. The state school network continued to exist, 
however, and no significant financial concessions were made to the church's private 
school ventures.
In 1936, however, two organizations inspired by Fascism were created and 
were unexpected if we consider the regime's initial projects. The first was an official 
youth organization of a paramilitary nature, the MP. To combat, and legalize the 
dissolution of the Preto's National Syndicalism in 1933 the SPN had created the Acçâo 
Escolar Vanguarda (Vanguard School Association), the first official Fascist youth 
organization, which was for volunteers244. After Rolâo Preto's movement had been 
dissolved the regime abandoned this first project and created the MP. Membership was 
compulsory and the organization was controlled by the Ministry of Education. Directed at
242 Cf. Oliveira Salazar, Discursos, 1928-1934, (Coimbra: 1935), p. 259.
243 Cf. Maria Filomena Monica, Op. Cit,.
244 Vide, Antdnio Costa Pinto e Nuno Ribeiro, A A cq&o Escolar Vanguarda (1933-1936). A juventude 




























































































urban areas where "dissolute vices" corrupted young people at secondary schools, the 
MP never achieved the dynamism of its Fascist equivalents and, as pointèd out above, 
was immediately taken over by religious services as the church showed some concern 
about this official venture. The second organization had different aims and the fact that its 
creation was authorized represented the introduction of a Fascist choreography at the time 
of the Spanish Civil War.
The LP was formed in 1936 as an anti-communist militia with para-military 
functions and police information and sent volunteers to fight on Franco's side. Under 
strict state control, it was joined by part of the Fascist minority duly accompanied by 
army officers. Any attempt to see in this organization any Fascist "tension" or influence 
on the regime has no empirical foundation but its creation certainly reflected the regime's 
cringing before the "red threat" in Spain even though the dictator always relegated it to the 
background.
Institutions like the SPN and the para-military institutions arose from the Fascist 
example, but little or nothing essential passed through them. As regards components and 
different proportions, almost all the other dictatorships of the period showed similar 
characteristics and inspirations. Basically the Portuguese "New State" did not share the 
tensions of mobilizations of its Fascist counterparts but encouraged apathy. The regime 
isolated the small urban universe, did not even trust the mass mobilization and counted on 
four important agents: police, bureaucracy, local notables and the church.
The regime skillfully mingled the administration and the party, which included 
the notables, and counted on the traditional élites and the political police to maintain the 
social order. The cooperation of the church was enough to maintain the provinces in a, 
hopefully, unchangeable order. It should be noted that the regime did not even need to 
create or transform rural unions in the sphere of the corporatist system since they did not 
exist in the north or centre of the country. In the south, where there were mainly large 
estates and where the agricultural proletariat was active the police was more alert while in 
the rural areas in the rest of the country this was not necessary.
5.4 SOME FINAL REMARKS
The peculiarity of the processes of the crisis of democracy associated with 
Fascism did not lie in the structural factors which contributed to the instability of the 
liberal political system but in the basic components of the anti-democratic coalitions 
which overthrew them. It lay in the fact that the Fascist parties led the process and took 



























































































of an interwar crisis (...) was not a universal phenomenon!...)"245, and it does not seem 
necessary to "force" to appear in all the processes of the overthrow of the liberal order of 
that period.
First, it would be better to synthesize the nature of the regime overthrown in 1926. 
Portugal's First Republic was not a young democracy taking its first hesitant steps in the 
"era o f the masses", as were so many others in the Europe o f 1918. It was not a product 
of increased popular suffrage based on mass parties, as were the Weimar Republic and 
post-war Italy, and as the Third Republic in France and, later, the Spanish Second 
Republic. The republican movement was the embodiment of the political aspirations of 
the "excluded" and of "oligarchic liberalism". With a program of modernisation steeped 
in nationalism, anti-clericalism, and a certain anti-plutocratism, it united under its 
umbrella various sections of the urban middle classes (which at the turn of the century 
practically meant Lisbon) on the one hand, and the popular sectors on the other.
Of course, while sharing certain unifying characteristics such as the First World 
War and the crisis which followed it, the republican parliamentary regime did represent 
an attempt to overtake "oligarchic liberalism”. Taking on the trappings of state and of a 
parliamentary system based on one-party hegemony, it pushed a program of accelerated 
secularization sacrificing almost all the rest of its program to the interventionist strategy 
defending the colonial patrimony. Following Sidonio Pais's brief 1917 dictatorship - and 
one which would anticipate numerous features that would come to characterise certain 
peripheral variants of fascist populism - the Republic was overthrown by a vast 
conservative coalition with the military acting as mediators.
In the questionable logic of a certain "sociology of modernisation" as to the 
relationship between economic and social change and the break-down of political 
systems, Portugal's case would seem to illustrate the classic example of a reaction by the 
"traditional" sectors, unable to brake the "modem" sector's stride within the bounds of 
the parliamentary system. Or, to use Organsky's terminology, a "compromise" from 
above was preferred, which would allow for the recuperation of some of the lost social 
and political hegemony. From this perspective it appears clear that the "New State" not 
only made room for their claims in the 1930’s, but tenaciously kept them up over 
time246.
Salazar once said to Henry Massis that his aim was to "make Portugal live 
habitually"247. Apart from its conscious demagogy, this "maitre-mot” which so delighted 
his French supporter sums up perfectly the traditionalist permanence of Salazarism. A 
functionalistic interpretation, however, could argue that Salazar's dictatorship did not
245 Geoff Eley, ” What Produces Fascism:...", p. 87 and 91.
246 Cf. Elizabeth Leeds, "Salazar's "modelo Econòmico....", Op. Cit., p. 13.




























































































undergo the totalitarian tension of Fascism because, owing to the nature of Portuguese 
society at the time, it did not need it. This interpretation, however, does not wash since 
this tension did exist in societies as industrialized as or less industrialized than the 
Portuguese one. As for more industrialized societies it is enough to mention France 
where, according to this theory, society would "ask for" the totalitarianism that Vichy did 
not give it. Salazarism was, rather, voluntarily non-totalitarian and allowed most of the 
population to "live habitually" as long as they did not "get mixed up in politics", which 
was an activity reserved for the ruling minority.
It is, however, a mistake to confuse Salazar's regime with a "pragmatic” 
dictatorship, at least in the period with which we are more concerned here (1933-45). 
Salazarism officially instituted an "organic" vision of society and tried with a certain 
perseverance to use all the ideological and social control instruments within its reach to 
bring it about: administration, corporatism, school system, state propaganda, local élites 
and the church. On the other hand, it reinforced the presence of the state in the economy, 
limited the autonomy of the economic élites and disciplined them with an iron hand.
Like all the other right-wing authoritarian regimes of the same period, 
Salazarism was inspired by a vast spectrum of "third away" ideologies, which had 
developed in Europe since the beginning of the century and basically include elements of 
social Catholicism and the Maurrazian radical right. As far as its institutions and political 
élites were concerned, i.e. the creation of a single party closely dependent on the 
government, the hegemony of the administration, the corporatist apparatus, the recruiting 
and composition of the political élite, Salazarism was close to the dictatorships of the 
same period which did not experience the more typical aspects of Fascism248.
However, in spite of the fact that a Fascist movement was not behind the crisis 
in Portuguese liberalism, one can still argue, as we have seen above, that Salazar’s "New 
State" was a national variant of it and some supporters of a wider concept of fascism will 
tend to criticize some of the positions here assumed. If just one final banality might here 
be allowed, within the scope of authoritarian regime's typologies, Portugal clearly puts 
us face to face with the classic dilemma of comparison: if we open up too much, 
everyone fits in; whereas if we close things up, no-one gets in. But there is one problem 
that cannot be avoided: including Portugal's case in the Fascist "family” is to lose that 
which has made the Fascist dictatorships a classic theme in social science research.
248 Cf. António Costa Pinto, "The "New State" of Salazar- An overview”, Richard Herr et alii (Edited 
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